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The current Acquisition Improvement Program (AIP) has
focused a great deal of attention on many of the perceived
management problems in the federal acquisition process.
Included among these are the motivation of contractors to
make productivity enhancing capital investments. Although
this problem has been addressed previously by profit policy,
the effect has been minimal. Most efforts have been directed
at the prime contractor level with little effect to date.
This research examines the complex array of factors which
result in productivity enhancing capital investment and
raises the question of what has been accomplished at the
subcontractor level.
The research, through the use of a subcontractor survey,
determined that little if any effort was expended at the
prime contractor level to motivate subcontractors to invest
in productivity enhancing capital equipment. Until recent-
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Productivity enhancing capital investments by defense
contractors have been a prime concern of Congress and DOD
since the early 1970s. Then Deputy Secretary of Defense
William P. Clements directed a full scale study of DOD pro-
fit policy with the goal of developing a policy that would
motivate defense contractors to make capital investments
which would reduce DOD acquisition costs [1:1] . Since
these original efforts, improvement of incentives for capi-
tal investment has been a high priority item within DOD.
Efforts came to a peak in early 1980 when Deputy Secretary
of Defense Frank Carlucci included "Encouraging Capital
Investment to Enhance Productivity" as an action item of
the Acquisition Improvement Program (AIP) . The action in-
cluded eight subactions with responsibility for implementa-
tion placed under the purview of the Under Secretary of
Defense for Research and Engineering (USDRE) "Industrial
Productivity Office" [2:22]. The AIP productivity enhancing
capital investment initiatives have resulted in a number of
efforts mostly targeted at the prime defense contractor
level [3:10-11]
.
Considering the size and impact the subcontractor base
has on DOD business, the question of what is being done at
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the subcontractor level requires addressing. The level of
DOD business accomplished at the subcontractor level is
between 40 and 70 percent with a nominal value of 50-60
percent [4:43]. In fact, much more production is done and
more dollars spent at the subcontractor and vendor levels
than at the prime contractor level (e.g., the B-l program
has 3000 subcontractors/vendors) [5:41]. Owing to this
level of subcontractor involvement in DOD business, there
is some thought that prime contractors should be encouraged
to pass on the positive financial actions initiated by the
Government [4:27],
The purpose of this research is to examine whether or
not there has been any productivity enhancing capital in-
vestment initiative flowdown from the prime contractor level
to subcontractors. The intent is also to test the validity
of current literature concerning the erosion of surge capa-
city and the profitability of defense business compared to
commercial business at the subcontractor level.
B. RESEARCH QUESTION
Given the preceding general objectives, the following
primary research question was posed: What methods do prime
defense contractors utilize to incentivize subcontractors to
invest in productivity enhancing facility improvements?
The following subsidiary research questions were deemed
pertinent in addressing the basic research question:
11
1. What have been the results of the DOD profit policy
to date in incentivizing prime contractors to make
capital investments?
2. Are prime contractors concerned with improving the
productivity of subcontractors?
3. Is there a flowdown of profit policy incentives to
the subcontractor?
4. How do defense subcontractors view the present profit
policy and do they perceive any impact on their
organization?
5. On what basis are capital investment decisions made
at the defense subcontractor level?
6. What impact have programs for improvement of capital




How effective are prime contractors ' programs for in-
centivizing subcontractors to make capital investments
and are these programs applicable for DOD use?
8. What are the characteristics of the defense industrial
base at the subcontractor level?
9. Should DOD have a flowdown policy for incentivizing
subcontractors through prime contractors?
C. SCOPE, LIMITATIONS, AND ASSUMPTIONS
1 . Scope
To complete the research in the time required, it
became apparent that a limited segment of prime contractors
to interview and from which subcontractor information could
be derived would be necessary. To this end, two aerospace
and two shipbuilding prime contractors were targeted. The
interview and subcontractor data presented is therefore,
necessarily biased toward these two industries. However, it
was felt that by combining the information received from
12
these two diverse industries, a representative cross section
of the defense industrial base would emerge.
Each prime contractor provided a list of subcon-
tractors they thought were subcontractors greater than 7 5
percent of the time. The resulting list of subcontractors
received from the prime contractors was further stratified
resulting in a total population of 258 subcontractors for
this study. To provide a complete perspective, a number of
DOD personnel within the productivity enhancement area were
interviewed to gain insight into their perceptions of the




The major limitation resulted from the lack of
information concerning a precise definition of what con-
stituted a subcontractor. The term subcontractor is easily
definable, however, to address defense subcontractors whose
major portion of DOD business is in the role of a subcon-
tractor, poses a significant challenge. The thrust of the
research was to determine what methods prime contractors
use to incentivize subcontractors to make productivity en-
hancing capital investments. Therefore, it was desirable
to obtain contractors who were, in fact, subcontractors and
not prime contractors who are privy to DOD capital incentiv-
ization programs. This purification of contractors evolved
as a major limitation.
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In conjunction with the above problem, each prime
contractor possessed different data processing capabilities
which further exacerbated subcontractor definition. Also,
a thorough search of Government resources indicated a lack
of data concerning the defense subcontractor base. In
fact, information concerning subcontractors has not been
collected by the Government since 1963 [4:129] .
The lack of current literature concerning .the sub-
contractor industrial base posed a limitation in attempting




Underlying the entire research was the presumption
that prime contractors are concerned with the economic
health and viability of their subcontractors. Additionally,
it was assumed that prime contractors have, by some means,
incentivized their critical subcontractors to make capital
investments in order to improve productivity and ultimately
lower prices
.
Also, this study assumes that the reader commands
a general knowledge or basic familiarity with DOD contract-
ing language and the Defense acquisition process.
D. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The research methodology utilized in this study con-
sisted of four basic components: (1) development of a
literature base by use of the Defense Logistics Studies
14
Information Exchange and the Defense Technical Information
Center and review of various journals and periodicals which
concern themselves with the federal acquisition process;
(2) interviews with four prime defense contractors; (3) a
survey of 258 subcontractors; and (4) interviews with DOD
personnel involved in capital investment incentivization
.
The data collected from the interviews and questionnaires
are presented in Chapter V.
E. ORGANIZATION OF THE REPORT
This report takes the reader through the subject at
hand in the most logical manner possible. Chapter II pre-
sents some basic background information concerning profit
policy, defense industry profitability, prime contractor
capital investment, defense industrial base productivity
and DOD awareness of subcontractor problems. Chapter III
describes the development and background of the interviews
and questionnaire development. Chapter IV is an in-depth
presentation and analysis of the interviews and question-
naire data. In Chapter V, conclusions and recommendations
are proffered.
15
II . BACKGROUND OF PRODUCTIVITY INITIATIVES
A. INTRODUCTION
This Chapter will chronicle productivity enhancing
capital investment efforts that have evolved from the mid-
70s to present. Aslo addressed will be aspects of defense
industry profitability, prime contractors capital investment,
industrial base productivity and awareness of subcontractor
capital investment needs at the DOD and prime contractor
level
.
The information provided in this chapter will present
the concern of DOD relating to the productivity of the de-
fense industrial base and the many efforts to correct the
problem. It will then evolve to ascertain the efforts
directed at the subcontractor level.
B. PROFIT POLICY CAPITAL INVESTMENT INITIATIVES
1. Profit '76
During the mid-70s, concern in DOD over the softness
of the defense industrial base, the low level of capital
investment and low profitability led then Deputy Secretary
of Defense William P. Clements to direct a full-scale study
of the DOD Profit Policy. The goal of the study was to
develop policy revisions needed to motivate defense con-
tractors in making capital investments which would reduce
defense department acquisition costs [1:11]. The study
16
indicated that profits as a percent of sales and return on
investment (ROD were lower for defense compared to commer-
cial business. This fact prompted Deputy Secretary Clements
in his testimony before the Joint Committee on Defense Pro-
duction to observe that:
...if it is efficient in the commercial marketplace for
for the Federal Trace Commission durable goods producers
to employ about 2 1/2 times the amount of facilities per
dollar of sales compared to the defense producer, then
there are probably productivity gains that could be made
if defense contractors increased their investment [6:39].
A major deterrent to the Weighted Guideline (WGL) method of
.
deriving a negotiated profit resulted from an inverse re-
lationship between risk and profit. A higher return was
provided on low risk than on high risk contracts [1:7] .
Additionally, the prenegotiation profit objectives provided
more profit on purchased direct materials, which required
less investment, than for investment intensive contracts. A
survey of 56 financial institutions to determine the availa-
bility of capital to defense contractors revealed that unless
problems in negotiated procurements and profit levels were
reduced, defense contractors would find it increasingly diffi-
cult to find the financing required [1:7]. In his paper on
defense contractor profits Lt Col Letzkus quoted Mr. Frank
A. Schrontz, then Assistant Secretary of Defense (Installa-
tion and Logistics), who stated:
Over the last several years, the level of contractor
facility investment in Department of Defense contracts
has been considerably lower than in comparable commercial
endeavors, even after taking into account government-fur-
nished facilities and equipment. The reasons for contractor
17
reluctance to invest in modern machinery and equipment
for use on DOD contracts are many and varied, but it is
clear that some are rooted in present procurement policy
which fails to recognize adequately (either in profit or
as an allowable cost) the facility investment which may
be required for efficient operation .... [7 -. 22]
The ultimate changes brought about by Profit '76 were
promulgated in Defense Procurement Circular (DPC) 76-3.
There were two major changes to DOD profit policy. First,
the imputed cost of capital for facility investment would be
considered to be an allowable cost for most negotiated con-
tracts which were priced on the basis of cost analysis.
Second, the contractor's level of facility investment is now
recognized in reaching a prenegotiation profit objective
under the WGL method. The logic of the profit policy was
the use of profits to motivate contractors to increase capi-
tal investment to modernize facilities and equipment, there-
by, in the long run, reducing the expense o-f defense
procurements [7:2-3].
Subsequent analysis of the effects of DPC 76-3 relative
to contractor investment in equipment and facilities reveal-
ed that contractors had not taken advantage of the incentive
aspects of investment to increase productivity [8:13].
Another study conducted by the General Accounting Office
(GAO) determined there was little indication that contractors
has responded positively to upgrading facilities and equip-
ment. This was due to the minimal level of emphasis given
capital investment in DPC 76-3 (10% of the profit objective)
.
The productivity award enhancement of DPC 76-3 lacked
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sufficient criteria for determining appropriate profit
allowance for productivity improvements. The report indi-
cated in general terms that the improvements initiated had
not, in fact, been successful and had done little more than
increase the profits realized by defense contractors' with-
out an offsetting increase in capital investment and result-
ant cost reductions due to efficiency. [9:i-iii]
2 . Defense Acquisition Circular 76-23
Based on the GAO report and other internal DOD
studies it became apparent that a revision to the WGL method
was necessary. The change manifested itself in Defense
Acquisition Circular (DAC) 76-23 in February 1980. Major
changes to the WGL included increasing the facilities in-
vestment factor from 6-10 percent to 16-20 percent and
changing profit policies for research and development and
services contracts [10:2]. The intent of the percentage
changes was to place more emphasis on the facilities invest-
ment portion of negotiated profits thereby enticing contract-
ors to increase capital investment.
Although DAC 76-23 provided increased importance on
facilities investment, cost was still the primary basis for
determining profits. In fact, cost still determined 72 per-
cent of the total profit objective [11:17]. Therefore, the
contractor remained as likely to forego capital investment.
A study to determine the effectiveness of DOD ' s Profit
Policy was conducted nine months after the implementation of
19
DAC 76-23 and was focused at the "grass roots" Contracting
Officer level. It concluded that the specific incentives
of facilities capital and the productivity reward were
having little or no effect on contractor investment patterns
.
[6:62]
Even with the extra emphasis on facilities capital
put in place by DAC 76-23, little increase in contractor
investment for more productive equipment and facilities was
transpiring. A factor of significant importance that must
be understood is the relationship between a cost based pro-
fit policy and capital investment. Under DPC 76-3 and DAC
76-23, any profit gained would be offset to some degree by
a profit loss from a reduction in profit based on costs
.
This result is a consequence of the cost reducing effects of
the greater efficiency resulting from the increase in in-
vestment [7:18]. It was becoming clearer at the time that
profit policy in and of itself cannot stimulate productivity
enhancing capital investment.
3. Profit '82
With the waters of the profit issue muddied to the
extent delineated above, the Air Force Systems Command under-
took a study to determine the precise state of the profit
policy and what could be done to correct deficiencies.
Profit '82 attempted to emulate as closely as possible the
events and data used in Profit '76. By using this technique,
analysis of the effects of policy changes could be evaluated.
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Pertinent to this research are the findings relative to con-
tractor productivity and capital investment. Some of the
findings of Profit '82 includes [12:53-56]:
1. "By itself, profit will not induce capital investment."
2. The structure of DPC 76-3 did not adequately reward
capital investment."
3. "The profit policy changes under DAC 76-23 significant-
ly reduced the potential impact of profit on capital
investment .
"
4. "The WGL special productivity factor has not been
used .
"
The study went on to make the following recommendations
relative to productivity and capital investment intent of
the profit policy [12:57-58]:
1. "DOD must have realistic expectations of the true
relationship between profit policy and capital
investment.
2. "DOD should revitalize the special productivity
factor."
Profit '82 continued the profit policy saga and added more
veracity to the conjectures that a cost-based profit policy
by itself is not the means by which to motivate contractors
to make productivity enhancing capital investments
.
4 . Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR)
In a letter to the Comptroller General in September
1983, the Chairman of the Defense Subcommittee, Congressman
Addabbo, stated that, during the fiscal year 1983 Congress-
ional shipbuilding hearings, the facilities cost of capital
had become an issue. It was concluded that making cost of
money for facilities capital an allowable cost does not
21
induce contractor investment in cost reducing facilities
.
The letter went on to direct a complete full-scale study
of Cost Accounting Standard 414 and DOD ' s profit policy
comparable in scope to Profit '76. Additionally, in
December 1983, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer
directed the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Acquisition
Management) Ms. Mary Ann Gilleece to initiate a new study
of DOD pricing policies. DFAIR was conceived and, like
Profit '82, will emulate as closely as possible Profit '76.
Results from DFAIR are not known at this time and will not
be available until the Spring of 1985.
It is anticipated that DFAIR may, in fact, produce
some substantitive changes to DOD ' s Profit Policy.
5 . Summary
Since recognition of inadequacies in the capital
investment structure of defense contractors, profit policy
has been used as the vehicle to correct the problem. Many
studies and changes to the profit policy have demonstrated
that profit policy alone cannot increase productivity en-
hancing capital investment. The next section will address
the interrelated aspect of defense contractor profitability.
C. DEFENSE INDUSTRY PROFITABILITY AND CAPITAL INVESTMENT
To totally understand the interrelationships of capital
investment, cost-based pricing, risk, profit policy, profit,
profitability, ROI , return on equity (ROE) and return on
assets (ROA) , it is necessary to be able to mesh these
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multifarious aspects into a congruous whole. All of these
factors, and others such as corporate strategy and competi-
tion, play an important part in the decision-making process
related to capital investments . It is beyond the scope of
this research to minutely explain each of these factors and
their relationships. However, it is necessary to look at
the profitability aspect at a simple level to demonstrate
the tradeoffs that will be made to ensure profitability.
For the purposes of this research, profit is defined as
earnings after taxes, or net income. Profitability is de-
fined as the measurement of profit relative to some base.
There are several measures of profitability such as ROI , ROE,
and ROA. [13:33]
A number of reports and studies have concluded that
defense business is less profitable than commercial business
and there is a migration away from defense business. For
example see references 4, 5, 13, and 14. The following
synopsis of facts tend to bear this fact out:
On one large program in a 12-month period, there was a
turnover of approximately 2500 subcontractors and suppliers
out of 6,000. On one large aircraft program the prime re-
ceived only 60 percent as many bids this year as received
last year. [5:8]
...the top 25 defense contractors went from almost 40
percent of their business in the defense area in 1958
to under 10 percent of their business in the defense
area by 1975. [4:39]
Profit '76 showed that contractors' DOD business
accounted for approximately two thirds of their total
cost volume. Cost Accounting Standards Board cost of
money data forms for 1980 projections for sixty-one
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similiar profit centers indicate that DOD business
is now only about 50 percent of their total. 115:37]
Depending on the indicator one looks at, defense business
can be portrayed as being as profitable as commerical busi-
ness. If one looks at profitability as a percent of sales,
defense contractors are not as profitable as commercial
businesses. However, if ROI is used as the indicator of
profitability, defense contractors can be as profitable,
or more profitable than their commercial counterparts or
the commercial business within their own firms [4:87]. This
anomaly can be easily explained when one considers the make-
up of ROI. If there is little capital investment in facili-
ties or equipment or if the Government provides equipment
and facilities, the contractors return on invested capital
is higher. In basic terms this is why defense industries
have a ROI comparable or higher with their commercial
counterparts. The question of why defense contractors in-
vest less in capital than commercial companies can be ex-
plained by looking back at the use of a cost based profit
policy and profit as a percentage of sales. With profits
based on cost it becomes less enticing for a contractor to
reduce costs by utilization of cost reducing capital equip-
ment and can, in fact, reduce the profit in subsequent con-
tracts. "Most contractors state frankly that they invest
as little capital as possible in facilities for production
on negotiated contracts to avoid reducing their ROI." [11:16]
This concept relates to the previous discussion of profit
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policy and the cost based determination of profit coupled
with the fact that DOD profits must be comparable with
commercial profits [15:37]. The prudent businessman will,
over the long run, take the necessary steps to balance risk
and reward. If the balance cannot be achieved through an
acceptable level of profit, it will be achieved through an
acceptable level of profitability. Avoiding added invest-
ment is a tempting course of action and is a viable business
strategy if the firm is simultaneously reducing its partici-
pation in the defense market [13:34-35]. In September 1980
the House Committee on Armed Services held intensive hear-
ings on the capability of the U. S. defense industrial base.
These hearings were continued by a ten member Defense
Industrial Base Panel, which found a serious decline in
defense industrial capability. They found that for example:
...during the past decade, the U.S. aerospace industry
invested approximately 2 percent of its sales in new
capital assets. The average rate of investment for all
U.S. industry during the same period was about 8 percent,
and the average rate for all U.S. manufacturing was 4
percent ... .For example, 60 percent of the metal working
equipment used in defense contracts today is more than
20 years old. [16:190]
To exacerbate the problem of capital investment at the
defense contractor level is the availability of debt financ-
ing. Defense contractors price-to-earnings ratio and their
bond ratings are low (about half as good as those of their
civilian counterparts) , and therefore most investment insti-
tutions are very reluctant to put their money in the defense
sector [4:61-62] . Part of the reason for this is the
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relative riskiness of defense firms based on the volatility
of earnings. When viewed through the eyes of the financial
market, a higher return is required to offset the relative
risk [14:278]. In a 1976 report to the Investment Policy
Study Group by The Conference Board, an independent nonpro-
fit institution, they reported:
...in general, the financial community was pessimistic
about the defense industry. Reasons given were unfavor-
able defense contract profits compared to commercial
product profits, considering the risks that defense con-
tractors face; uncertainty, both in fulfillment of
contracts and winning of future contracts; and a number
of other negatives such as the untoward effects on a
defense contractor of certain DOD policies, procurement
regulations and tactics, and administrative practices....
unless these problems can be reduced, if not eliminated,
the defense industry is likely to find it increasingly
difficult to secure both the short-term and long-term
financing it requires [16:195].
Another factor which must be considered is the relative
instability of defense business. There are a number of
reasons for the instability including the annual appropria-
tion cycle, congressional oversight, short term contracts.
Instability in the acquisition process is the basic reason
for the lengthening of acquisition lead time and discourage-
ment of productivity enhancing capital investments [17:303].
This shortsighted approach to contracting does not allow
industry to see far enough into the future to calculate the
necessary ROI for capital investment. During the June 1984
Air Force Systems Command sponsored Chief Executive Officers
Conference the question of "What incentives are likely to
induce the defense industry to improve productivity with
26
new facilities and equipment?" was posed. The overwhelming
concensus of responses cited stability as the major motivat-
or of capital investment. [18:2-6]
In summary, depending on the indicator used, defense
business can be portrayed to be as profitable as commercial
business. However, upon closer examination, when using ROI
as the indicator, it becomes obvious that the comparable
profit effect is achieved through the use of small amounts
of capital equipment. This interrelationship coupled with
defense business instability is at the root of the produc-
tivity problems and has led to the decapitalization of
defense contractors.
D. INDUSTRIAL BASE PRODUCTIVITY
Owing to the great variety of products and services con-
tracted for, their respective inputs and outputs and the
different internal measures of performance used in the
defense industry, it is impractical to attempt to present a
specific, restrictive definition of contractor productivity.
Rather, the general definition of productivity as the rela-
tionship between input of resources and output of goods and
services is adequate in understanding the concept of produc-
tivity. However, it must be noted that specific definitions
relative to the specific contract must be derived in order
to actually measure productivity for that particular contract.
The inability to perform this function resulted in the failure
to effectively utilize the productivity portion of the WGL
referred to earlier. [19:7]
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The result of reduced capital investment has manifested
itself in decreased productivity. The decrease in capital
investment outlined in the previous section has been systemic
within the defense industry as many defense contractors have
opted for an asset strategy which maximizes returns in the
short-run [20:4]. This short-run attitude has not been
confined solely to defense contractors, but has been more
prevalent than in the commerical ' marketplace . As a whole,
the U.S. was behind Japan, Canada, Germany, France, and
the United Kingdom in average annual rate of capital invest-
ment as a percent of output for 1983 [21:1]. This is a
trend that has plagued U.S. industry since the early fifties.
Recent articles in the Wall Street Journal and Business Week
have catalogued the reversal in this trend over the past two
years. A number of reasons (e.g., the strength of the dollar
and competitive forces) are fueling the turnaround.
DOD is undertaking a number of programs and initiatives
to improve the posture of productivity enhancing capital
investments and productivity as a whole within the defense




. CURRENT DOD PRODUCTIVITY INITIATIVES
1 . Introduction
As a result of the 1980 Defense Industrial Base
hearings, the Secretary of Defense told Congress in the
1982 posture statement that "productivity in defense-support-
ing industries is too low" [16:190]. In the subsequent
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promulgation of the so called "Carlucci initiatives", a
great deal of effort and time has been spent on the pro-
ductivity issue [16:190]. AIP Action 5 (Encouraging
Capital Investment to Enhance Productivity) and the eight
subactions in conjunction with other Action items (e.g.,
Multiyear Procurement, Program Stability and Increase Com-
petition in the Acquisition Process) are intended to pro-
vide an integrated approach to the resolution of capital
investment and productivity problems. In May 1981 Dr. Richard
DeLauer established a DOD Task Force to Improve Industrial
Responsiveness (TFIRE) , a joint service team to address the
industrial preparedness issue. One of the results was a
draft DOD Guide entitled Improving Productivity in Defen se
Contracting [16:207] . The guide proposes a number of ways
that productivity can be improved. Some of these are,
(1) termination protection, (2) award fees, (3) shared sav-
ings provisions, and (4) Government technology funding
[20:12-21]
.
2 . Industrial Modernization Incentives Program
Dr. DeLauer established a tri-service committee,
chaired by the Navy, in February 1982 to prepare a proposed
unified DOD policy on "technology modernization". The
report back to the Deputy Secretary of Defense recommended
an innovative new program entitled Industrial Modernization
Incentives Program (IMIP) . The Deputy Secretary then
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established a steering group with RADM J. Sansone as the
chairman to test the concept. [22:1]
The IMIP program is a successor to the Technical
Modernization (TECHMOD) program instituted by the Air Force.
Although IMIP expands on the TECHMOD program, IMIP is
applied through a formal agreement between industry and DOD
which contains incentives for modernizing and improving the
productivity of the industrial base. The IMIP agreement is
based on a structured analysis which evaluates the needs of
the overall facility and, after Government validation is
implemented through the increased use of manufacturing
technology, modernization and engineering/management appli-
cations in the facility. It is expected that the incentive
structure of IMIP will allow industry to substantially in-
crease capital investments, primarily with their own
financing.
IMIP is not limited to strictly capital investment
incentives. It also emphasizes making productivity improve-
ments in all facets of the manufacturing process. The in-
centive structure of IMIP includes a shared savings reward
based on increased productivity achieved through capital
investment. Contractor investment protection through the
use of an unfunded contingent liability guarantee allows for
Government compensation of the undepreciated balance of the
capital assets in the event of premature termination
[23:23-26]. Additionally, IMIP is not necessarily
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targeted at a single contract, but can cover a group of
contracts or all contracts in a facility [24]
.
A notable aspect of IMIP is that it recognizes the
need and identifies the means by which subcontractors and
vendors will be included in the program.
The IMIP test program has been decentralized to
allow each DOD component to pursue incentives they feel will





As noted earlier, the Air Force TECHMOD program was
in existence prior to IMIP. The most notable contract under
TECHMOD is the F-16 aircraft program at General Dynamics/Ft.
Worth. The program has been successful and spawned the
Industrial Technology Modernization (ITM) program, which is
basically the TECHMOD/IMIP equivalent for subcontractors
.
The difference is that the prime contractor organizes and
executes the program.
Currently in the Navy, plans are underway and being
implemented which will pass IMIP incentives to subcontractors
The firms to attempt these first efforts are Grumman Aero-
space and General Dynamics/Morton Thiokol [25:10].
4 Manufacturing Technology Program
Also resulting from AIP Action 5, was the Manufactur-
ing Technology (MANTECH) program. The objective of MANTECH
is "to assure that advanced manufacturing processes and
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equipment are available to defense contractors to enable
them to significantly improve their productivity and re-
sponsiveness as elements of the defense industrial base."
The proclaimed purpose of the program is "to reduce material
acquisition costs and lead times by providing the advanced
manufacturing technology necessary to improve industrial
base productivity in those situations where the private
sector is unable or unwilling to do so." [16:201] Unlike
IMIP, MANTECH is totally funded by Government sources.
MANTECH capital equipment is usually pushing the state-of-
the-art and is not, for various reasons, cost effective
enough for private industry to purchase the equipment.
Each of the three services sponsor their own MANTECH
program.
5 . Summary
As demonstrated by the number of initiatives and
programs promulgated over the past four years, the issues of
productivity and capital investment have moved to the fore-
front. It should be remembered that these, initiatives/pro-
grams are intertwined with other initiatives and should be
viewed holistically . The intent is to weave into the entire
acquisition process the tools with which to motivate contract-
ors. When looked at as a whole, it is easily discerned that
the majority of initiatives are intended to provide stability
to the acquisition process. It is stability that is so
necessary in the capital investment decision making of pru-
dent businessmen.
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F . SUBCONTRACTOR AWARENESS
The reason for this research, as noted in Chapter I, is
to answer questions relative to the incentivization of
productivity enhancing capital investment efforts at the
subcontractor level. In order to address the subject it
is first necessary to present some background and characteri-
zation of the defense subcontractor base. The defense sub-
contractor base is not easy to characterize due to the fact
a subcontractor can range from an extremely small single
product/service firm to the largest of corporations . The
intent of the researcher is to address the subcontractor who
is, in fact, a subcontractor a majority of the time. Since
1963, DOD has not collected any information on the subcon-
tractor level and below. This exacerbates the characteriza-
tion of the subcontractor base [4:129] . A report completed
by the Rand Corporation for the Air Force in 1977 found that
the lower tiers of the defense industrial base were not
easily identifiable [26:3]. The largest source of informa-
tion found relating to subcontractors was The Defense
Industry by J. Gansler.
1 . Subcontractor Health
It is unclear from current literature whether the
subcontractor base is healthy or adequate for current needs
.
Depending on the source, conflicting data is derived. The
following are examples of available data:
...ample surge capacity at prime level but not at the
subcontractor level. [4:5]
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Subcontractors and parts suppliers represent the
bottleneck in the production surge capacity. [4:128]
...1968-1975 number of active aerospace-industry
subcontractors decreased from over 6,000 to under
4,000.... Between 1970-1975 the Air Force reported
that the number of subcontractors leaving defense per
year more than doubled. [4:129]
In general small defense contractors (subcontractors
and suppliers) have lower profits and far higher risks
than larger ones. [4:138]
Subcontractors often need to borrow working capital;
however, in most cases they are less able than the
prime contractors to obtain non-bank financing. This
is principally due to the size and/or financial con-
dition of the subcontractors and suppliers . When
profits from DOD contracts are minimal subcontractors
do not make capital investments. Additionally, when
profits are low many small and intermediate size
companies find it beneficial to leave the defense
marketplace. [5:26]
Lower tiers of the industrial base have adequate
capacity to produce products for the Air Force in
peace time. [26:24]
When firms choose to exit the defense business, they
seem to be primarily motivated by a decline in the
demand for their products rather than any disenchant-
ment with military business. [26:42]
As the above quotes demonstrate, typifying the health of the
subcontractor/supplier base is not easily accomplished.
Part of the reason is the diverse levels of subcontractors
coupled with the difficulty in identification. Based on the
1980 Defense Industrial Base Panel's conclusion of an over-
all erosion of the defense industrial base, it can be safely
concluded that problems at the subcontractor level do exist.
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2 . Subcontractor Unfairness
All of the problems documented earlier relating to
profitability for prime contractors apply to subcontractors.
There are a number of reasons which cause the plight of the
small to intermediate-sized defense subcontractor to be
more tenuous. The following chronicle some of these
reasons
:
a. A dual economy comprising the large contractors and
the subcontractors/suppliers are treated equally
through legislation, policies and regulations which
hide the subcontractors 1 problems [4:128].
b. Some subcontractors have a single product and are
tied to one prime contractor [4:137].
c. Subcontractors are required to supply their own
plants and equipment, unlike a number of prime con-
tractors, and make less ROI in comparison with prime
contractors and civilian counterparts [4:5].
d. Because the profits of Government contractors are
restricted and the cost of borrowing money cannot.be
considered an allowable cost, many small contractors
and suppliers can be "pushed" out of Government
business [5:18]
.
e. Inability to obtain needed non-bank financing [4:137].
f. Instability which manifests itself in subcontractors
vulnerability to stretchouts and cancellations [4:137]
g. Continual threat of vertical integration by the prime
contractor during periods of slack business [4:137].
h. Overall lack of management talent [4:137].
As can be seen the defense subcontractor has, for
the most part, more of an "uphill" climb than prime con-
tractors. Instability at the prime contractor level is
magnified at the subcontractor level. As noted above the
subcontractor is less able to cope with program stretchouts
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and is extremely vulnerable to vertical integration by the
prime contractor. Additionally, contract risk is regularly
passed down from the prime contractor to the subcontractor.
"One study found that in more than 85 percent of the cases
where the prime contractor had a cost-plus-fee contract, the
subcontractor had a "firm fixed-price contract" [4:146].
3 . Subcontractor Overview
Subcontractor problems and deficiencies are beginn-
ing to come to the forefront. This recognition started with
the 1980 Defense Industrial Base Panel and is beginning to
become a part of current thinking. A recent Air Force/
Industry study of the aerospace industrial base entitled
Blueprint for Tomorrow included subcontractors as part of
the study. Conclusions from the study found that "subcon-
tractors were not receiving the same opportunities afforded
prime contractors and the subcontractor market is a roller-
coaster driven by uncertainty" [27:24]. Some of the
recommendations that evolved were directed at the subcon-
tractor level (e.g., provide increased opportunities to
subcontractor base and inclusion of subcontract program in
the business strategy of systems programs) [27:62].
The use of IMIP is beginning to be implemented at
the subcontractor level which, if successful, should provide
incentivization for productivity enhancing capital
investment.
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The crux of current literature tends to indicate
that the subcontractor base is a nebulous entity which is
not sufficient to meet surge and mobilization capacity; how-
ever, there is conflicting data. Little has been done to
date to provide incentives for improvement of the subcon-
tractor base, but current initiatives are beginning to
address the problem.
G. SUMMARY
This chapter has chronicled the means by which DOD has
attempted to motivate defense contractors to make produc-
tivity enhancing capital investments, prime contractor
capital investment, and productivity, and current produc-
tivity measures. The discussion then evolved to describe
subcontractor base problems and incentivization initiatives.
The next chapter will provide data concerning the back-
ground and development of the interviews and survey conducted
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III. INTERVIEW/SURVEY BACKGROUND AND DEVELOPMENT
A. INTRODUCTION
As has been alluded to throughout this paper, the con-
tinued concern over the eroding industrial base coupled
with the Government's efforts to incentivize productivity
by enhancing capital investment at the prime contractor
level, begs the question of what has been happening at the
subcontractor level. A thorough research of current litera-
ture did not reveal any definitive information concerning
the economic health of the subcontractor industrial base,
other than the references previously cited. They only
generally indicate there is a decrease at the subcontractor
level accompanied by longer lead times for certain materials/
components. However, the literature is rife with informa-
tion and data concerning the health and productivity of
different segments of the prime contractor community. For
example, see References 1, 4, 13, 14, 20, and 21. As a re-
sult of this apparent disparity, once again considering that
the industrial base is composed of 50-70% subcontractors,
the question of whether or not prime contractors are as in-
terested in their subcontractors * productivity and continued
viability as the Government is with the primes' poses a
significant question. This chapter will explore the logic,
direction and interrelationships of the questions embodied
in the interviews and questionnaire.
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B. SURVEY/INTERVIEW BACKGROUND
The survey and interviews were intended to determine
whether or not there had been any flowdown of investment
incentives from the primes to subcontractors. Considering
the limited time and resources available, four major DOD
prime contractors, two each from the aerospace and ship-
building industries, were selected for interviews and to
provide information concerning their subcontractors . The
interviews were conducted on a nonattribution basis to
foster candid responses and to preclude the necessity of
higher authority approval.
Although different at each prime contractor's facility,
the persons interviewed included a Vice-President for Finance,
a General Manager, Subcontract Directors and Material Direct-
ors. In addition to obtaining a general background concern-
ing their experience, standard questions were asked of each
individual. A copy of the interview questions are contained
in Appendix A. The information requested concerning subcon-
tractors was in the form of a list of subcontractors, which
the primes narrowed down using the parameters previously dis-
cussed of greater than 75 percent of the subcontractors
business being in the role of a subcontractor. This turned
out to be an almost impossible task and the primes attempted
to tailor the list through their personal experience. Their
lists were further purified with the final result being a
total of 258 subcontractors identified and mailed a
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questionnaire. A copy of the questionnaire is contained
in Appendix B. Once again, to elicit candid and honest
responses, they were informed that all responses were non-
attributable, and no means of determining the individual
company's responses were included in the questionnaire.
The names of the companies which were mailed surveys are
listed in Appendix C. In addition to industry interviews
and a survey, a number of leading DOD personnel working in
the various productivity enhancing and profit policy offices
were interviewed. These interviews were conducted to
attempt to gain an "inside" perspective of DOD current
thought and policies concerning the enhancement of the
subcontractor base. A copy of the interview questions is
included as Appendix D.
C. PRIME CONTRACTOR INTERVIEW DEVELOPMENT
Four major DOD prime contractors * Material and Subcon-
tractor Management personnel were interviewed to gain in-
sight into corporate efforts to motivate subcontractors to
improve productivity. The interview was designed to identify
any and all efforts exerted by the prime, not exclusively
capital investment initiatives.
Another major topic addressed was the prime contractors'
perception of the state of the subcontractor industrial base.
Identification of material or service delays, excessive lead




The interviews, were structured to also determine any
incentivization efforts that were successful and had the
potential to be emulated by DOD
.
Although not a scientifically founded analysis, inter-
viewees were asked to comment on the success of the capital
investment incentivization efforts at their level of the
current profit policy. The logic was to ascertain whether
there was any disparity between their comments and the docu-




The overriding consideration in developing the survey
questionnaire was to ask questions which would answer the
primary and ancillary research questions from the subcon-
tractors* point of view. Due to the number of companies
and the need to determine which companies fell within the
"greater than 75 percent" parameters, the questionnaire was
mailed to each.
The questions were structured to accomplish the follow-
ing objectives:
1. Determine the size of the firm/division
2. Total and subcontract business with DOD
3. Manufacturing make-up
4. Awareness and effect of DOD Profit Policy and other
incentivization programs
5. Perception of prime contractor interest in subcontractors
6. Basis for capital investment
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Opinions concerning the need for prime contractor
incentivization of subcontractors
The first few questions were used to determine the ex-
tent of business as a subcontractor in order to definitize
and isolate those subcontractors with greater than 75 per-
cent of their DOD business in the role of a subcontractor.
Additionally, a general impression of the capital intensity
of the firms was desired. Although a sidelight, this para-
meter was felt to be a relevant factor concerning the need
for capital investment.
The next area addressed was to ascertain whether sub-
contractors were aware of incentivization efforts by the
DOD and how these efforts had affected them. The questions
then evolved to determine whether there existed any effort
on prime contractors ' part to motivate subcontractors to
make productivity enhancing investments . If there was a
negative response to the primary question, a further itera-
tion of the question was used as a means to determine whether
there existed a perceived concern for the subcontractor by
the prime. The final question on incentivization was to
secure the subcontractors ' opinion of the need for prime
contractors to provide capital investment incentives
.
The subsidiary questions addressing the firms means of
measuring profitability as well as profitability of DOD
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business compared to commercial business were intended to
assist in comparing the responses with current literature.
E. DOD INTERVIEW DEVELOPMENT
To develop a well-rounded picture of the subcontractor
incentivization question, it was necessary to interview
knowledgeable personnel within DOD. These interviews, also
on a nonattribution basis, were conducted with the intent
of determining the perceptions and opinions of persons inti-
mately knowledgeable with the current productivity initia-
tives and with past and present profit policy incentives
for productivity enhancing capital investment. The inter-
views examined their opinions concerning the health of the
subcontractor industrial base, prime contractor efforts in
incentivizing subcontractors, and whether primes and/or the
DOD should be concerned with incentivizing subcontractors.
F. SUMMARY
This chapter has provided an in-depth overview of the
background and development of the interviews and the survey
questionnaire used. Also, the intent and logic behind the
questions used in the interviews and questionnaire were
identified
.
The following chapter will present and analyze the data
generated by the interviews and questionnaire.
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IV . INTERVIEW/SURVEY DATA PRESENTATION AND ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
The previous chapter discussed the framework and objec-
tives of each portion of the interviews and questionnaire as
well as the overall objectives. This chapter will provide
a presentation of the data derived from the interviews and
questionnaire
.
The focus of the research was to be on the firms with
greater than 75 percent of their DOD business in the role of
a subcontractor. The firms which met this criteria were
considered the "target group" . The target group is the main
thrust, however, other groups emerged which provided addi-
tional information and insight and are included in the data
presentation and analysis.
The diverse results of the interviews and survey are
presented in a logical sequence which will be assimilated
into a cohesive analysis in the summary portion of each sec-
tion. These segments include: (1) Prime Contractor Inter-
views; (2) Survey Responses; (3) Survey Demographic Data;
(4) Prime Contractor Incentivization Concern; (5) DOD Incen-
tivization Program Awareness: (6) DOD Business Profitability;
and (7) DOD Interview Responses.
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B. PRIME CONTRACTOR INTERVIEW RESPONSES
Four major prime contractors, two each from the aerospace
and shipbuilding industry, were targeted to provide subcon-
tractor information and as interview subjects. In order to
protect the anonymity of respondents there has been no
attempt to
.
separate the responses provided in the interviews
by industry owing to the fact that the intent of the study
was to, as much as possible, make aggregate observations.
The first area addressed was the prime contractors
'
level of concern with subcontractor productivity. In all
cases, the responses indicated a low to non-existent con-
cern. The perception at the prime level was that competi-
tion provided all the incentive required for productivity.
Only when there was a sole source situation and the sole
source was not meeting schedules or standards did the prime
become interested.- In this situation, one of two actions
would be taken based on comparative costs. An effort to
develop a second source was undertaken or, if the product
required high non-recurring costs or extensive qualification,
efforts to assist the subcontractor in meeting schedule/
quality requirements were effected.
The second area addressed was flowdown of profit policy
investment incentives to the subcontractor. Each interview-
ee indicated there was no effort on their part, as a prime
contractor, to flowdown investment incentives. The main
reasoning was a lack of need owing to competition providing
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the needed incentives. However, one interviewee did indi-
cate it was unwritten policy to use cost-type contracts
with subcontractors if the prime's contract with the
Government was a cost-type contract. This was accomplished
to lessen the risk being passed on to the subcontractor.
The next question dealt with determining what method,
if any, primes were using to motivate subcontractors in
making productivity enhancing capital investments. Since
abundant documented evidence exists relating to the lack of
success of DOD capital investment incentives at the prime
contractor level, the logic was to determine whether the
prime's efforts in this area were successful and could serve
as a model to be emulated by DOD. Unfortunately, all inter-
viewees indicated there was no standardized or concerted
effort on their part to motivate subcontractors to make
productivity enhancing capital investments. It was indi-
cated, once again, that competition provided the impetus
for maintaining productivity levels commensurate with the
marketplace.
The next area dealt with the prime contractors ' percep-
tion of the health and apparent erosion of the subcontractor
industrial base. The general opinion expressed was that
there was an erosion of the bas*e. This perception was owing
to the fact that there were far more sole sources at the
subcontractor level and subcontractors seemed to prefer
commercial work where it was available. It should be noted
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that within the shipbuilding industry, the indication was
that there is less business available both in the Government
and commercial arena which is causing the erosion. Another
factor, and probably the most pervasive, was the instability
associated with Government contracts. One firm cited a case
in which fifteen aircraft were to be produced. The first
year funds were restricted, then they were faced with a nine
month stop work order. Another firm's statistics on man-
power loading from 1952 to the present graphically displayed
the acute changes in Government business loading. Mr.
Jacques Gansler noted in his book The Defense Industry
that the rate of vertical integration by defense prime con-
tractors was higher than in the commercial sector and was
causing the demise of a number of subcontractors [4:45].
Of the four primes interviewed, only one firm indicated that
vertical integration was a policy within the company to
attempt to provide constant workload and stability. However,
all interviewees acknowledged that vertical integration had
been used and would continue to be used whenever a deficien-
cy existed in the supplier/subcontractor base. Another
significant observation made by all but one of the inter-
viewees indicated that while there were enough subcontractors
available to provide current production needs, little if any
surge capacity was. available.
Next, the current innovations of TECHMOD , MANTECH , and
IMIP were discussed to ascertain if any affect had been
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experienced at the prime level and in the primes ' opinion
what affect the programs might have at the subcontractor
level. Only one prime contractor had been involved in a
program, which had not progressed beyond the initial survey
stage. The lack of awareness of these programs was sur-
prising, however, this could be attributable to the fact
that the expertise of the personnel interviewed did not re-
quire familiarization with manufacturing efficiencies at the
prime level. None of the interviewees thought that the pro-
grams would readily provide any effect on their subcontract-
ors, however, considering the expertise level regarding
these programs, the responses were discounted.
Considering the previous responses, answers to the
question concerning long range commitments by primes to up-
hold the subcontractor base are not surprising. There was
no known strategy, policy or plan either at the corporate
or the strategic business unit level for providing a struc-
tured approach to enhancing the subcontractor industrial
base
.
The final question relating to subcontractors, was
whether the prime contractors thought a policy at the
Government/DOD level should be instituted to require a
flowdown of capital investment incentivization . Again, not
surprisingly, the responses were unanimously in the negative
The key concern was the current amount of directives and
regulations with which they must contend. The addition of
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more such regulations was not a popular subject. Even
though it was felt the subcontractor base might be eroding
somewhat, a directed flowdown policy was not seen as the
answer. In essence, the pervasive thought seemed to be
that there were enough subcontractors to provide for current
production. Unless the Government wished to provide funding
of some sort to increase the base and surge capacity, the
primes were comfortable with the situation.
The final question was intended to determine whether
the capital investment incentivization portion of the profit
policy has had any impact on the capital investment decision-
making process. Three of the respondents disclaimed any
capital investment decisions being made on the basis of
profit policy. Capital investment decisions were and are
made on the basis of need, available capital and financial
analysis. One respondent took the totally opposite view,
stating that profit policy coupled with Cost Accounting
Standard 414 have been key factors in capital investment
decisions.. To support this claim, a graph of capital invest-
ment growth over the past five years and projected growth
(shown to the researcher) presented an almost exponential
factor of growth. Questioning by the researcher of other
prime contractors over the past year coupled with the above
responses indicates that the capital investment incentiviza-
tion intent of the profit policy has had spotty impact.
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C. SURVEY RESPONSES
The search for respondents, as noted earlier, was con-
ducted at each of the four prime contractors . Ultimately a
survey base of 258 subcontractors was selected. Of this
number, sixty-seven responses were received, for a 25.97
percent response rate. Although not as high as desired, the
number was considered sufficient to proceed with valid re-
search analysis.
Owing to the breadth of the subcontractor base which
responded and the number of respondents which did not fit
into the "greater than 75 percent subcontractor" range, it
was determined that, in addition to the analysis of the tar-
get group, a broader analysis should be pursued. To this
end, the contractors were segregated into six subgroups for
analysis. The subgroups were comprised of the following:
1. Contractors with greater than 75 percent DOD business
as a subcontractor
2. Contractors with less than 75 percent, but greater
than 10 percent DOD business as a subcontractor
3. Contractors with less than 10 percent DOD business
as a subcontractor
4. Contractors with greater than 75 percent of their
total business as a DOD contractor
5. Contractors with less than 75 percent, but greater




Contractors with less than 10 percent of their total
business as a DOD contractor
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This categorization allows for analysis of each distinct
characteristic in relation to the total population surveyed
as well as the "greater than 75 percent" subcontractor group
Appendixes E and F provide a detailed segregation of explana-
tory and numerical responses by subgroup.
1 . Demographic Data
The first five questions were developed to determine
the size of the subcontractors, extent of subcontracting,
dollar volume, basic manufacturing processes, and amount of
subcontracts won on a competitive basis.
Question 1 provided data concerning the size of the
firm/division in terms of employees. Results for the total
population and "greater than 75 percent" subcontractors are
shown in Tables la and lb. The relative composition of the
target group fairly-well represented the entire population
with the predominance of firms being in the 1 - 1,000
employee range (84.6% compared to 79.1%) . When compared to
the other segregations, the distribution was relatively the
same with the exception of the less than 10 percent subgroup
Question 2 provided a common base in order to segre-
gate contractors by amount of DOD business as a percentage
of their total business. Question 3 followed up to deter-
mine the number of contractors within each category that
derived greater than 75 percent of their business/sales in
the role of a subcontractor to a prime DOD contractor. The
resulting firms were the target group for the survey and the
51
analysis. Of the total pupulation, twenty six respondents
(38.8%) were within the parameters.
TABLE la








1 - 100 26 38.8
101 - 1,000 27 40.3
1,001 - 5,000 12 17.9











Source: All tables were developed by the researcher unless
otherwise noted.
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Tables Ila and lib depict the breakdown of the total
population and greater than 75 percent subcontractors by
total DOD business. Of the firms that fell within the tar-
get group, over half (53.8%) were also in the greater than
75 percent total DOD business category. This would tend to
indicate a very high reliance of total business on DOD con-
tracts. Of this reliance on DOD contracts, the greatest
portion of the business is as a subcontractor.
Table III provides the distribution of subcontract
percentages for the entire population. The percentage of
contractors with more than 50 percent of their business as
a subcontractor was slightly more than half (56.7%) . How-
ever, the number of firms above 75 percent was more than
double that between 50 to 74 percent as a subcontractor.
When this was analyzed further by breaking the companies
with greater than 75 percent total DOD business down into
subcontractors, it revealed that 46.7 percent of these firms
functioned in the role of a subcontractor greater than 75
percent of the time. The results of this analysis is shown
in Table IV. The conclusion is that a company with a larger
share of total DOD business is also more likely to be a
large subcontractor.
Question four dealt with the total dollar business
in the role of a DOD subcontractor. This question was posed
to gain some insight concerning the magnitude of subcontract-
or dollar business compared to the entire population. Inter-
estingly, there were no target firms with sales below
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10 - 24% 4
25 - 49% 7
50 - 74%
greater than 75% 14
TOTAL 26
Relative Cumulative












$500,000. In fact, 53.8 percent were above the upper
threshold of $5 million. Table V presents the composition
for the total population and Table VI for the target group.
Of the firms with less than ten percent DOD business as a
subcontractor, two-thirds of their dollar business was below
$100,000. This indicates that DOD business for firms in
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TABLE III
DOD Business in the Role of a Subcontractor
TOTAL
Total Population
Response Absolute Relative Cumulative
Frequency Frequency (.%> Frequency (%)
greater than
10% 9 13.4 13.4
10 - 24% 8 11.9 25.4
25 - 49% 12 17.9 43.3
50 - 74% 12 17.9 61.2
greater than
75% 26 38.8 100.0
67 100.0
TABLE IV
DOD Business in the Role of a Subcontractor
Firms with Greater than 75% Total DOD Business
Relative Cumulative





10 - 24% 4
25 - 49% 7

















this category would have little impact on their total
operations and might therefore provide little impetus for




Annual Dollar Sales as a DOD Subcontractor
Total Population
Response Absolute Relative Cumulative
Frequency Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
greater than
$100,000 9 13.4 13.4
$100,000 - $500,000 8 11.9 25.4
$500,000 - $2,000,000 12 17.9 43.3
$2,000,000 - $5,000,000 12 17.9 61.2
greater than $5,000,000 26 38.8 100.0
TOTAL 67 100.0
TABLE VI
Annual Dollar Sales as a DOD Subcontractor
Firms with Greater than 75% DOD Subcontracts
Response Absolute Relative Cumulative
Frequency Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
greater than $100,000 .0 .0
$100,000 - $500,000 .0 .0
$500,000 - $2,000,000 7 26.9 26.9
$2,000,000 - $5,000,000 5 19.2 46.2
greater than $5,000,000 14 53.8 100.0
TOTAL 26 10 0.0
The next question involved was the type of manu-
facturing process used. This question was to ascertain the
capital intensiveness of the firms surveyed and asked
whether the firm was labor intensive, capital intensive, or
balanced between capital and labor intensive. The informa-
tion provided a basis to establish insight relevant to the
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amount of benefit that would be derived from a productivity
enhancing capital investment program. Also, the Standard
Industrial Classification (SIC) code was solicited to ascer-
tain the mix of businesses surveyed. A number of the firms
were not aware of their SIC code and the compilation only
shows those that responsed. Appendix G lists the SIC codes
and their definition for the firms that responded.
The composition of the firms from the total popula-
tion and the target group are displayed in Tables VII and
VIII. As can be seen, the composition of the target group
is comparable with the total population. As shown by
Appendix F this fact did not prove to be true for all com-
parisons. The less than 10 percent subcontractor and total
DOD business subgroup was markedly skewed toward the balance
between labor and capital category, with none in the labor
intensive category. The less than 75 percent but greater
than 10 percent subcontractors, also shown in Appendix F
tended to be less capital intensive (15.6%) and more labor
intensive (46.9%) . A significant note is that the greater
than 75 percent total DOD business subgroup was also more
reliant on labor intensive (43.3%) and significantly lower
than the population in capital intensive (10%) processes.
This would seem to indicate that firms with greater amounts
of DOD business in relation to total business are less
capital intensive. Is this fertile ground for productivity












































In an article, Dr. Robert F. Williams cited a survey taken
in 1981 by himself and Mr. Daniel Carr concerning contractor
motivation theory which stated:
Labor intensive firms had the most regard, balanced firms
the second most, and capital intensive firms the least
regard for providing a good product, company survival,
developing a skilled work force, developing new capability,
establishing a long-term business relationship, and im-
proving cash flow. These industrial firms with larger
Government business expressed somewhat more utility for
survival, company growth, and improved cash flow than
did other firms [28:51].
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Based on this analys-is it would seem that having a higher
proportion of labor intensive firms with a high amount of
Government business would be a desirable position from the
Government's perspective.
The information derived from the SIC codes indicated
that as expected, the firms represented a broad subcontract-
or base cross-section of the four prime contractors who
provided the survey list. Of the 67 survey respondents,
only 27 indicated knowledge of their SIC code. Of the 27
respondents only two SIC code categories had more than one
respondent. These codes were, as shown in Appendix G,
3662 and 3679 which are; Radio and Television Transmitting,
Signaling, and Detection Equipment; and, Electrical Compo-
nents not elsewhere classified. Although less than half the
total respondents knew their SIC code, the firms that did
reflected the desired results: a complete aggregation across
the subcontractor/supplier base.
Question seven asked what percentage of contracts
received from a prime contractor are won on a competitive
or noncompetitive basis. The question was posed to determine
the relative amount of contracting that was accomplished in
a competitive manner in the role of a subcontractor to a
prime defense contractor. This turned out to be 78.5 per-
cent competitive and 21.5 percent noncompetitive. When
compared to a base such as the Navy's competition statistic
for 1983 of 40 percent, the percentage appears more impressive
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The total population was. very close with 77.3 percent com-
petitive and 22.7 percent noncompetitive. On the surface,
indications are that prime contractors, in fact, do a better
job of obtaining competitive bids at the subcontractor level
than is achieved by the ODD with prime contractors
.
Characterization of an average member of the target
group (DOD subcontractor greater than 75 percent of the
time) would be: (1) a firm with 101-1,000 employees, (2)
above 25 percent of their total business is with DOD, (3)
sales as a DOD subcontractor greater than $2 million, (4)
manufacturing process that is balanced between capital and
labor, and (5) bids competitively on 78.5 percent of their
business as a subcontractor to a prime contractor.
2 . Prime Contractor Incentivization Concern
The questions under this topic, as the title implies,
were posed to determine what efforts or programs prime con-
tractors had used to provide incentives to subcontractors
for capital investment or productivity enhancing initiatives.
Also, if there were no incentives provided, what perception
do subcontractors have of the prime contractors ' concern
for the subcontractors continued viability. Next, the basis
on which capital investments are made was determined as an
insight into "possible means by which subcontractors would be
motivated. The final question dealt with subcontractors'
opinion concerning the need for prime contractors to provide
capital investment incentives.
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Questions 9, 10 and 11 dealt with, efforts by the
prime contractor to incentivize subcontractors.
Question 9.: In the subcontract work you do for prime
defense contractors is there effort on
the primes ' part to incentivize you to
invest in productivity enhancing equipment?
Question 10: If the answer to question nine was positive,
how effective are the prime contractors
'






Question 11: What methods do prime contractors use to
incentivize your firm to make these producti-
vity enhancing capital investments? (please
be as specific as possible)
Of the 67 respondents, only 16 (23.9%) answered
positively. A different ratio was received from the target
group where eleven of the 26 (42.3%) respondents answered
in the positive and accounted for 68.75 percent of the total
positive answers. When correlated with the absolute number
of positive responses (11) from the greater than 75 percent
total DOD business group, indications are that the greater
the percentage of DOD business, the greater the probability
of receiving incentives from a prime contractor. This is
further validated owing to the total negative response in
all subgroups from the less than 10 percent firms. The re-
maining five firms with positive answers fell in the less
than 75 percent but greater than 10 percent subgroups.
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Question 10 was posed to assess the success of prime
contractors 1 incentivization efforts for the firms answer-
ing positively on Question 9. The grouping of the responses
tended toward the lower end of the scale for the total
population and the target group. Tables IX and X illustrate
the relationship. The conclusion is, of the firms that have
received prime contractor incentivization, the efforts of
the primes has met with limited success
.
To gain a better insight into the incentivization
methods used by prime contractors, Question 11 requested
respondents to give a detailed explanation. Only 14 respond-
ents answered the question. The responses were segregated
by subgroup, as illustrated in Appendix E, to determine
whether any patterns would emerge. Unfortunately, it
appears that most of the respondents did not totally under-
stand the question and provided sketchy information. Some
of the more positive responses included; cooperative teams
investigate processes for cost reduction, guaranteed rates
of production, engineering consultations, purchase of equip-
ment, commitment to long term orders, and shared savings.
Once again the overriding theme was competition and the pro-
viding of a stable level of work by the prime contractor
which induces capital investment at the subcontractor level.
Question 12 asked the subcontractors whether or not,
in their opinion, prime contractors are concerned with their
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continued viability as a defense subcontractor. Again, the
explanatory responses were segregated into the six sub-
groups to assess patterns
.
Of the total population, 64.2 percent of the firms
perceived that primes were interested in their continued
viability as a defense subcontractor. The target group ex-
hibited an even stronger feeling with a 76.9 percent posi-
tive response. All subgroups, with the exception of the less
than 10 percent, approximated or exceeded the population
average. The 10 percent subgroup for subcontractors and
total DOD business were well below the population average at
11.1 and 37.5 percent respectively. Table XT depicts the
responses by subgroup.
The pervasive theme throughout the explanatory re-
sponses for positive answers was that prime contractors need
a viable and competitive base to perform their own business
and the only way to foster this climate is by being concern-
ed with their subcontractor's perpetuity. A number of cases
cited quality, on-time schedules, unique product, extensive
testing and qualification for product and requisite techno-
logy as reasons primes are concerned with the subcontractors '
continuation. Negative explanatory responses again dealt
with competition and the fact that price was the only concern
of the subcontractor. Others stated primes were only inter-
ested to the extent that the subcontractors affected their
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explanatory responses to the question were not provided when
a respondent answered in the negative. This precluded a more
complete analysis of these responses
.
To ascertain what motivates capital investment at
the subcontractor level, Question 13 was posed.
Question 13: On what basis do you make capital invest-
ments? Please elaborate (e.g., Return on




















































Less than 75% but Greater than 10% Total DOD Business
Yes 18 62.1 62.1




Less than 10% Total DOD Business
3 37.5 37.5
5 62.5 100.0
TOTAL 8 100 .0
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The reason for this question was to see if any responses
indicated a pervasive means that could be useful in struc-
turing incentivization programs by prime contractors.
Tables XII through XIV depict the responses received from
the total population, target group, and greater than 75
percent total DOD business subgroup. All three groups clus-
ter fairly close in their responses. Obviously, the return
on investment (ROD and "Other" group dominate. The explana-
tory portion of the question indicated that the Other group
consisted mainly of the following: required to maintain
competiveness , as needed only, af fordability , investment
tax credits, long term ROI , short term profit, increase pro-
duction, acquire new capabilities. These are a few of the
responses in the "Other" category, however, the pervasive
response was "need" . As shown in Tables XII through XIV,
a number of firms gave more than one response which coupled
ROI and other categories together. This indicated that more
than one factor was considered before making a capital
investment.
TABLE XII
Basis for Capital Investment
Total Population
Response Absolute Relative Cumulative
Frequency Frequency (%) Frequency (%)
Return on
Investment 47 50.5 50.5
Return on Equity 3 3.2 53.8
Payback 4 4.3 58.1




Basis for Capital Investment
Firms with Greater than 75% POD Subcontracts
Response Absolute Relative Cumulative
Frequency Frequency (.%) Frequency (%)
Return on
Investment 18 50.0 50.0
Return on Equity 1 2.8 5 2.8
Payback 3 8.3 61.1
Other 14 38.9 100.0
TOTAL 36 100.0
TABLE XIV
Basis for Capital Investment










Return on Equi ty 2 4.7
Payback 1 2.3
Other 20 46.5
TOTAL 4 3 10 0.0
The final question, Question 18, asked whether, in
the subcontractors' opinion, there is a need for prime con-
tractors to provide capital investment incentives to them.
The total population reflected an absolute frequency
of 37 positive and 30 negative responses for a relative fre-
quency of 55.2 and 44.8 percent. The target group closely
approximated the total population with an exact 50-50 split
between positive and negative. The surprising responses
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were in the greater than 75% total DOD business subgroup
where 70 percent felt a need for prime contractors to
incentivize subcontractors. Although not germane to the
present study it is interesting to note, the less than ten
percent subcontractor and total DOD business subgroup re-
sulted in a 77.8 and 62.5 percent negative response. Table
XV illustrates the responses by subgroup.
Explanatory notes were segregated by subgroup for
analysis. Unfortunately, for the most part, if a negative
response was given there was no accompanying explanation.
Therefore, Question 18, in Appendix E is biased with almost
all positive explanations. Of the positive responses re-
ceived, there was a dichotomy of reasons and degrees to
which incentivization should take place. However, the most
pervasive theme was that if there was a guarantee of steady
work by a prime contractor, then productivity enhancing
capital investments would be accomplished. This equates to
stability. Another relatively common response to the ques-
tion related to quality levels together with low profit mar-
gins on Government contracts which inhibited capital
investment. Taking into account the almost even distribu-
tion of responses, it appears that there is no consensus of
opinion at the subcontractor level on which to base a con-
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Less than 75% but Greater than 10% Subcontractor
Yes 22 68.8 68.8
















Less than 75% but Greater than 10% Total DOD Business
Yes 13 44.8 44.8




Less than 10% Total DOD Business
3 37.5 37.5
5 62.5 100.0
TOTAL 8 100 .0
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In summary, a s.ubcontractor in the target group has
a 42.3 percent chance that the prime has provided incentivi-
zation to some degree with limited success. Continued via-
bility of the subcontractor is a concern of the prime
contractor. Capital investments are made based on ROI and
some other consideration, most likely "need". Whether or
not incentivizations should be provided by the prime con-
tractor is inconclusive based, on this analysis.
3 . POD Incentivization Program Awareness
Questions 8 and 14 relate to current DOD efforts
being used to motivate contractors to invest in productivity
enhancing capital equipment. The intent was to ascertain
whether or not any of the subcontractors had participated
in the use of these incentives and their impact. Explanatory
responses were again segregated by subgroup as a means of
identifying patterns.
Question 8: Is your company aware of the DOD profit
policy and specifically the capital invest-
ment incentivization portion of the policy?
(If yes, what has been the impact on your
firm?)
Question 14: Is your firm familiar with the concept and
implementation of productivity enhancement
capital investment programs such as IMIP,
MANTECH, or TECHMOD . (If yes, in what manner
has one or more of these programs affected
your firm?)
Approximately one-third (34.3%) of the population
were aware of the capital incentivization portion of the
profit policy included in the Weighted Guidelines (WGL)
.
The target group was slightly higher at a relative frequency
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of 38.5 percent. The moat positive subgroup was the greater
than 75 percent total DOD business with a relative frequency
of 46.7 percent. The subgroup having the least knowledge of
the profit policy incentives was the less than 10 percent
subcontractor and total DOD business, with a relative fre-
quency of 11.1 and 12.5 percent respectively.
Of the firms with knowledge of the policy, the ex-
planatory responses were overwhelmingly negative and there
was no distinguishing demarcation between subgroups .
Examples of the responses included; (1) no significant im-
pact; (2) nothing positive; (3) very little impact; (4)
negligible impact; (5) small impact, because the policy does
not identify significant amounts of capital; (6) WGL is of
little help; (7) little, because substantial investment in
machinery and test equipment would be needed to make any
significant impact; and, (8) very little, because in all
profit policies to date the "bottom line" price becomes the
driver. Further examples of the same theme are listed in
Appendix E
.
Awareness of productivity enhancing capital invest-
ment programs such as IMIP, TECHMOD and MANTECH for the popu-
lation was 28.4 percent. The target group was more aware of
these programs, with a relative frequency of 38.5 percent.
The subgroup having the greatest knowledge of the programs
was the greater than 75% total DOD business, with a relative
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frequency of 40 percent. As would be expected, the less
than 10 percent s.ubgroup indicated complete ignorance of
the programs
.
Of the firms responding positively to Question 14,
none expressed an impact to date in the explanatory notes
.
In fact, only one firm had implemented any of the programs
and that firm was in the early stages without any measurable
affect to date. Another frim had recently agreed to partici-
pate in the General Dynamics/Fort Worth program. A number
of the firms expressed interest and indicated that a working
or study group had been established to assess the programs
.
One firm took an agressively negative attitude toward the
programs stating the approval process and paperwork necessary
coupled with the expense made it simpler and faster to do
without Government involvement.
Considering the newness of the programs and the re-
cent impetus for their implementation at the subcontractor
level, the lack of awareness is understandable. The major
subcontractor productivity incentivization emphasis to date
has been the Industrial Technology Modernization program
instituted on the F-16 program at General Dynamics/Forth
Worth. Both firms indicating existing or pending programs
were part of the F-16 effort.
In summary, 38.5 percent of the target firms were
aware of the DOD profit policy capital investment incentivi-
zation efforts. Of these firms, it was found that
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relatively little impact has been made by the policy.
Awareness of recent capital investment programs was also
38.5 percent, with no affect on any of the target group to
date
.
4 . POD Business Profitability
Current literature, as referenced in Chapter II,
indicates that the Defense Industrial Base is eroding. One
of the tenets tendered for this erosion is the migration of
firms from defense business to more lucrative commercial
business. The intent of Question 16 and corresponding ex-
planatory responses requested by Question 17 was to test the
supposition that commercial business is more profitable than
defense business. To preclude any confusion concerning the
meaning of profitability, Question 15 was posed to ensure
that the firms 1 own definition of profitability was used in
responding to Question 16
.
Question 15: On what basis do you measure profitability?
(e.g., percent of sales, return on equity,
return on assets, etc.)
Question 16: Does Government defense business provide the
same profitability, using your measure of
profitability, as does your commercial
business?
Question 17: If the answer to Question 16 was negative,
please explain.
A number of firms responded to Question 15 with more
than one answer. The responses which most firms used twice
were, Return on Assets (ROA) and Percent of Sales. These
two counted for approximately 80 percent of the total
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population and 83 percent of the target group. All other
subgroups, with, the exception of the less than 10 percent
subgroup, closely approximated the population's relative
frequency. The less, than 10 percent subcontractor and
total DOD business subgroups were highly concentrated in
the Percent of Sales category with 81.8 and 70 percent re-
spectively. The comparison of less than 10 percent firms
with the target group and greater than 75 percent total DOD
business tends to corroborate the premise, that if profits
are not commensurate with risk, the prudent businessmen will
attempt to maximize profitability. This maximization is
attained through the use of older or less expensive capital
equipment which allows the ROA to provide a suitable profit-
ability [13:34]. Tables XVI and XVII display the total
population and target group outcome. Once again, the pur-
pose for the question was to clarify a firm rs definition of
profitability prior to posing Question 16.
Response to Question 16 proved to be anything but-
conclusive on a broad basis. As can be seen in Table XVIII,
which delineates the responses in each subgroup, there is an
almost even split concerning the profitability of Government
versus commercial business . This fact does not preclude the
presumption that there could be a migration to commercial
business of enough firms within the 50 percent category to
cause an erosion, especially in critical components, of the
defense industrial base. The indication is that, in
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TABLE XVI






Return on Assets 22 23.7
Percent of Sales 52 55.9








TOTAL 9 3 10 0.0
TABLE XVII
Basis for Measurement of Profitability





Return on Assets 11 30.6
Percent of Sales 19 52.8









general, depending on the product of the firm, defense busi-
ness is as profitable as commercial business.
The researcher's analysis of Question 17 explanatory
responses by subgroup did not reveal any major differences
between groups. A myriad of reasons for commercial business
being more profitable were cited with the four most oft
repeated being: (1) Government profit policy limitations on
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Less than 75% but Greater than 10% Total DOD Business
Yes 10 34.5 34.5
No 19 65.5 100.0
TOTAL 29 100 .0
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profit regardless of risk; (2). Extra overhead costs
associated with- Government business; (3) Non-recognition
.of the cost of money; and (4). Disallowance of costs. These
responses are typical of reasons given throughout past and
current literature concerning defense business profitability
However, the small subcontractors, who are not necessarily
receiving progress payments as is the prime, cannot afford
the extra overhead and cost of money associated with defense
business. These costs are reflected in their loss of
profit [4 :148] .
Within the profitability category, the target group
can be typified as using more than one means of defining
profitability, the most common being Percent of Sales and
ROA. The use of ROA in comparison to the less than 10 per-
cent subgroup is significant owing to the relationship of
profitability based on assets to the amount of assets em-
ployed. The target group was a perfect split relating to
profitability of Government versus commercial business.
Reasons for lower profitability ran the gamut, but did
coalesce into the four distinct areas identified above.
D. DOD INTERVIEW RESPONSES
Interviews of DOD personnel involved in productivity
enhancement and profit policy were conducted to provide
insight into the current DOD perspective. The amount of
effort presently being expended to assess the current profit
policy and to provide a means to incentivize productivity
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enhancing capital investment is considerable. At present,
IMIP is receiving a great deal of emphasis and is undergoing
a trial phase 122] . A Profit Policy review entitled
Defense Financial and Investment Review (DFAIR). is currently
underway and will report out in early spring 19-85. These
efforts are a direct result of the Defense Acquisition
Improvement Program initiatives [2:21].
Once again, to gain information concerning the present
Profit Policy, the question of whether or not the current
policy was and is a motivator for capital investment was
asked. The overall consensus was that the policy does not
incentivize capital investment and cannot as long as it is
cost-based. Some of the interviewees indicated that in con-
junction with other programs, Profit Policy could assist in
capital investment incentivization . The outcome of this
question was expected, and reflects current information con-
cerning Profit Policy usage in concert with other incentivi-
zation programs in a systematic manner [21:8].
The question of whether prime contractors are concerned
with motivating subcontractors to make capital investments
to improve productivity received mixed responses . The
majority responded in the negative. However, one of the
interviewees felt that with incentivization from the Govern-
ment through the use of award fees, primes would be more
than willing to assist subcontractros . Another interviewee
thought that primes were concerned with some of their sub-
contractors but lacked a vehicle by which to incentivize them
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The general opinion concerning the decline or erosion
of the subcontractor base was surprising. Two respondents
had no opinion, while others thought that in isolated in-
stances there was a degredation. Other interviewees thought
the number of subcontractors had declined but not the capa-
city. One interviewee felt that the problem existed in
isolated industries, but was caused more, in these indus-
tries, by Occupational Safety and Health Administration and
Environmental Protection Agency. The overall consensus
seemed to be that there was little, if any, erosion of the
subcontractor defense industrial base
.
The area addressed next solicited opinions as to
whether the DOD should be concerned with motivating sub-
contractors to make productivity enhancing capital invest-
ments and, if so, what methods should be used. All inter-
viewees agreed that DOD should be concerned to some degree
with the motivation of subcontractors . The degree was an
issue between the interviewees depending on whether the DOD
expected prime contractors to maintain mobilization capacity.
If the mobilization factor was a primary concern, then the
DOD must do more than let the market forces prevail. Some
suggestions included; motivate primes to assist subcontract-
ors through the use of incentive and award fee contracts; use
of modernization incentive programs such as Industrial
Technology Modernization through the prime contractor; more
positive ways for prime contractors to flow-down progress
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payments to subcontractors; and, inclusion of subcontractor
base considerations in the program acquisition strategy.
The overall synthesis of the different interviewees on the
topic seemed to be that market forces and few rudder orders
from DOD would maintain an adequate subcontractor/supplier
base. However, if surge and mobilization capacity were
included in the scenario, then positive direct DOD inter-
vention was required.
In order to be aware of as current information as
possible, the question concerning initiatives and ongoing
programs to incentivize subcontractors was broached. The
interviewees were not aware of any new initiatives besides
the IMIP type arrangements which are now being targeted at
the subcontractor level. A few of the newer IMIP programs,
similiar to General Dynamics/Fort Worth ITM program, are
being started at the subcontractor level through General
Dynamics/Morton Thiokol and Grumman Aerospace {25:10]. It
is expected the furtherance of the flowdown of these programs
to subcontractors would provide a different response to
Question 14 of the questionnaire, if asked, in a year or two.
The final structured question posed to the interviewees
dealt with their view of the defense industrial base and
their thoughts on what efforts should be accomplished to
improve the base. The consensus of opinions favored stabili-
zation above all other efforts. Whether the stabilization
came through incentivization programs, multi-year programs
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or by other means, it is. the key to increased productivity
and lower overall systems price. Other specifics included
increased emphasis on productivity in acquisition strategy,
some advance buying for surge capacity, and fostering a
health cooperative attitude between industry and DOD
.
E . SUMMARY
The main focus of this chapter has been to reflect the
major opinions of prime contractor, subcontractor, and DOD
personnel regarding their perceptions of capital investment
incentivization flowdown to subcontractors in the defense
industrial base. This was accomplished by interviewing
prime contractor personnel, examining the responses made by
subcontractors to a questionnaire, and interviewing knowledge-
able DOD personnel. The interviews sought to elicit infor-
mation and opinions from prime contractor and DOD personnel
concerning the flowdown of incentives to subcontractors and
the necessity thereof. The questionnaire sought to express
the subcontractor opinion on various aspects of capital in-
vestment, profitability, and incentivization efforts by
prime contractors . The responses to each of the interview
and survey questions, where applicable, were summarized in
tables or in narrative form.
To capsulize, prime contractors' responses indicated:
(1) a lack of concern and perceived lack of need for incenti-
vizing their subcontractors to make productivity enhancing
capital investments; (2) competition for the most part was
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all the incentive needed at the subcontractor level; (3)
made no effort to flowdown Profit Policy capital investment
incentives to subcontractors; (4) no structured plan or
method on their part to motivate subcontractors; (5) felt
there was an erosion of the subcontractor base due to more
sole sources, however, there are enough subcontractors to
provide current production needs; (6) vertical integration
was not a predominant means of increasing revenues; (.7)
there are no long range commitments by the primes to im-
prove or uphold their subcontractor base; and (8). did not
think that DOD policy requiring a flowdown of capital incen-
tives was needed or desirable.
The average subcontractor within the target group is a
firm typified by (1) 101-1000 employees; (2) greater than
25 percent of their business is with DOD; (3) sales as a DOD
subcontractor is greater than $2 million; (4) manufacturing
rpocess is balanced between capital and labor intensive;
(5) bids competitively on 78.5 percent of their business as
a subcontractor to a prime contractor; (6) has a 42.3 per-
cent chance that a prime contractor has provided incentiviza-
tion to some degree with limited success; (7) continued
viability is a concern of their prime contractors; (8) capital
investment is based on ROI and some other consideration,
most likely "need"; (9) unsure whether or not the prime
should incentivize them to make productivity enhancing
capital investments; (10) has a 38.5 percent chance of being
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aware of DOD profit policy and the policy has. had little if
any impact on the firm; (11) has a 38.5 percent chance of
being aware of other DOD capital investment programs, with
no affect to date; (12) use more than one means of defining
profitability, usually as percent of sales and ROA : (13) is
split 50-50 between Government and commercial concerning
profitability
.
The summary of responses provided by DOD personnel
interviewed included; (1) did not think present Profit
Policy incentivized capital investment; (.2) majority felt
that prime contractors were not concerned with incentivizing
their subcontractors; (.3) thought that the overall there
was little, if any, erosion of the subcontractor industrial
base; (4) felt that DOD should be concerned to some degree
with the motivation of subcontractors, the degree depending
on the level of mobilization capacity considered necessary;
(5) indicated capital investment programs were now being
targeted at the subcontractor level; and (6) thought that
the key to increased productivity and lower systems prices
was through stabilization of the acquisition process.
The next chapter will contain the principal findings,
conclusions, recommendations, suggestions for further re-
search, and answers to the specific research questions.
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V. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS, CONCLUS IONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
A. PRINCIPAL FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
The objective of this study was to examine the methods
by which prime contractors motivate subcontractors to make
productivity enhancing capital investments . The principal
findings and conclusions were derived from opinions received




Identification of "true" defense subcontractors is
extremely difficult . There is no known definition
used by DOD or prime contractors that characterizes a
subcontractor. In fact, a large volume subcontractor
may also be a large volume prime contractor. The
identification and definitization of what constitutes
a subcontractor who should be targeted for motivational
efforts, and is segregated from current DOD efforts at
the prime level, presents an almost impossible task.
Although not a specific research question, it became
obvious throughout the research effort that a common
usage of the term "subcontractor" was not used. This
fact was borne out during the entire evolution of the
research. Lacking a precise definition, or at least
a range, of subcontractors who should be targeted for
incentivization and assistance, it is impossible to
formulate policies to address their problems as it
relates to the defense industrial base. In other words,
if we do not know what the "animal" looks like how can
we catch it and cure it?
2 Prime contractors are not interested in incentivizing
subcontractors to make productivity enhancing capital
investments . In general, prime contractors interview-
ed, subcontractors responding to the questionnaire,
and DOD personnel interviewed indicated that little, if
any subcontractor capital investment incentivization
effort is being effected by prime contractors. Compe-
tition was seen as the driving force in providing a
viable subcontractor base. This face was verified by
subcontractor responses concerning the amount of con-
tracts received on a competitive basis. Additionally,
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the low positive response rate relative to prime
contractor incentivization for investment indicated
a lack of effort on the primes' part. However, it
must be noted, that the firms who were identified as
"true" subcontractors for the purpose of the analysis,
did respond more favorably. It appears that prime
contractors are more concerned with the productivity
of subcontractors with a greater portion of their
business in the role of a subcontractor.
There is no structured or unstructured methodology
by which prime contractors motivate subcontractors
to make productivity enhancing capital investments .
Of the four major prime contractors interviewed, there
was no plan for incentivizing subcontractors at all.
This was corroborated by the responses from the sub-
contractors and interview data from DOD personnel
.
Subcontractors perceived an interest from the prime
contractor only so far as they were concerned with
the competition available at the subcontractor level.
This was also supported by the prime contractors who
stated, they would provide guidance and assistance in
order to provide a second source when required.
Again the forces of competition are expected to, and
seem to, provide a sufficient subcontractor base.
Perceptions by prime contractor inte rv iewees and POD
interviewees were inconclusive relative to erosion of
the subcontractor base . As noted in Chapter IV, in-
terviewees indicated, for the most part, there was an
erosion, however, it was not pervasive or debilitating.
This may be a short-sighted view concerned only with
the present and discounts the capacity and productivity
necessary for surge and mobilization. As one inter-
viewee stated "I'm not sure the subcontractor base is
unhealthy for a peacetime environment.
The flowdown and impact of profit policy and current
capital investment incentivization programs has been
negligible . Of the subcontractors who professed know-
ledge of the profit policy and associated incentives,
the responses were overwhelmingly negative. This is
not surprising considering the main effort has been
toward incentivizing prime contractors and what is
targeted for prime contractors will not necessarily
work at the subcontractor level. Current literature
and the informal survey taken by the author indicate
the policy has not been effective at the prime level,
therefore, has little chance of being effective at
the subcontractor level. Even fewer subcontractors
were aware of the current capital investment incentives
(IMIP, TECHMOD, ITM and MANTECH) and none had
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experienced an impact on their operations to date.
In all fairness, it must be pointed out that recent
emphas.is on the subcontractor level of these programs
is in the infancy stage and has had little time to be
effective or the impact evaluated.
6
.
Stability of workload would provide the most incen-
tive for capital investment at the subcontractor level .
Although not a new or novel conclusion, subcontractor
explanatory responses, as noted in Chapter IV, to
Question 18 indicated a steady work level would pro-
vide the incentivization necessary to make capital
investments
.
7 Depending on the product, defense business is as pro-
fitable as commercial business at the subcontractor
level . This conclusion is based on the almost perfect
split of respondents from the target group and all
other groups. This conclusion does not agree with nor
does it totally disagree with current literature. As
noted earlier, the contention is that the subcontractor
base is eroding owing to the movement of subcontractors
from defense business to commercial business . Re-
sults of the survey do not indicate this is not
happening, rather, that on the average, defense busi-
ness is as profitable as commercial business . Whether
or not there is a migration from defense business,
owing to defense business versus commercial business
profitability, cannot be determined from the survey.
B. RECOMMENDATIONS
1 The POD should be concerned with incentivizing capital
investment at the subcontractor level . As noted
earlier, 50 - 60 percent of the dollar value of con-
tracts goes to subcontractors and represents a sizable
sum considering the current DOD procurement budget.
If, as is stated policy, DOD is concerned with incen-
tivizing productivity enhancing capital investments,
then logic dictates that efforts and policies to ensure
a flowdown to subcontractors be effected.
2 DOD should define what it considers the subcontractor
base and the surge/mobilization capacity actually
desired. At present, the expressed concern for surge/
mobilization and erosion of capabilities at the sub-
contractor is given "lip service". However, until the
nebulous subcontractor who is the target for incentivi-
zation is defined, any efforts will be ill-founded and
ineffective. The definitization efforts should be on
an industry basis. As exhibited by the subcontractor
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questionnaire responses, not all firms feel that in-
centivization efforts are necessary. It is this re-
searcher's opinion that subcontractors should be
segregated by industry to identify the areas that need/
require capital investment to provide a healthy base.
Being averse to increasing the administrative burdens
placed on defense contractors, some type of reporting
system will be necessary to quantify the defined
subcontractors
.
3 . POD should become involved in determining ways in
which the defined subcontractors can be incentivized
to make productivity enhancing capital investments .
As was demonstrated in the prime contractor interviews
and subcontractor questionnaire responses, prime con-
tractors are doing little to incentivize subcontract-
ors. This should not be a shock to DOD since most
incentivization efforts and concern for industrial
base erosion to date has been directed at prime con-
tractors. What impetus, other than maintaining com-
petition for immediate requirements, does the prime
contractor have for engendering increased capacity at
the subcontractor level? Without some kind of incen-
tivization for concern at the prime level and vehicles
by which capital investment incentives can be passed
to the subcontractor, little can be expected. Some
possible vehicles to provide the flowdown are in place.
These include IMIP objectives for subcontractors and
use of Cost-Plus-Award-Fee and Incentive-Fee contracts
which require prime contractor incentivization efforts
.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH
It is recommended that further research be conducted in
the following areas:
1. Determining the parameters that define a defense sub-
contractor. Additionally, the research should include
identification of subcontractor groups by industry and
possibly geographic location which require targeting
for incentivization efforts. Industries with suffi-
cient (e.g., capacity large enough to fulfill surge and
mobilization requirements) subcontractor capacity and
competition would not be addressed.
2. Methodologies that would best be suitable for capital
investment motivation of subcontractors . Recognition
that tailoring of programs to address particular capi-
tal investment needs, rather than a uniform or "shotgun"
approach, would be required.
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3. The extent of backward integration by prime contract-
ors as a contributing cause to loss of subcontractors
from the defense industrial base. Information derived
from the research indicated that vertical integration
was not common unless capabilities did not exist at
the subcontractor level. However, the sample was ex-
tremely small and therefore inconclusive.
D. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
As a synopsis of the information presented the following
is a reiteration of the primary and subsidiary research.
questions and their results.
Primary Research Question
Question: What methods, do prime contractors utilize to
incentivize subcontractors to invest in productivity en-
hancing facility improvements?
Answer: The research did not reveal any structured method
of subcontractor incentivization efforts being made by
prime contractors. The only methods discovered were based
on maintaining a stable source of supply or correcting the
quality of subcontractor supplied materials/products .
Subsidiary Research Questions
Question: What have been the results of the DOD profit
policy to date in incentivizing prime contractors to make
capital investments?
Answer: Of the four prime contractors interviewed, other
prime contractors interviewed over the past year and the
DOD personnel interviewed, the concensus of opinion was
that the profit policy has had little impact on capital
investment decisions. One of the prime contractors inter-
viewed provided a totally diverse perspective. They stated
that profit policy coupled with CAS 414 was a major driving
force in their capital investment decisions . This firm
appears to be the exception rather than the rule and in
the researcher's opinion should be discounted.
Question: Are prime contractors concerned with improving
the productivity of their subcontractors?
Answer: The research indicated that subcontractor pro-
ductivity was not a concern of the prime contractor. The
general concensus appeared to rely on competition to pro-
vide the necessary productivity.
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Ques.tion: Is there a flowdown of the profit policy in-
centives to the subcontractor?
Answer: None of the prime contractors interviewed attempt-
ed to flowdown profit policy incentives to their subcon-
tractors. It appears that almost the reverse is happening
owing to the amount of firm-fixed-price contracts between
prime and subcontractors when the prime contractor has a
cost-type contract with DOD
.
Question: How do defense subcontractors view the present
profit policy and do they perceive any impact on their
organizations?
Answer: Of the firms that were aware of DOD profit policy,
the responses were overwhelmingly negative. There was
little perceived positive impact regarding incenti vization
of capital investment efforts of the profit policy.
Question: On what basis are capital investment decisions
made at the defense subcontractor level?
Answer: Not surprisingly most subcontractors make invest-
ment decisions based on Return on Investment. However,
surprisingly the "Other" category, which ran the gamut
from maintaining a competitive edge to need, was used to
make capital investment decisions. It became clear, based
on the number of dual responses, that more than one cri-
teria was considered prior to making a productivity en-
hancing capital investment.
Question: What impact have programs for improvement of
capital investment, other than DOD profit policy, had on
subcontractors?
Answer: Of the subcontractors aware of programs such as
IMIP, MANTECH, TECHMOD, and ITM none had experienced any
impact to date. Those enrolled in the programs felt that
positive results would be achieved.
Question: How effective are prime contractors' programs
for incentivizing subcontractors to make capital invest-
ments and are these programs applicable for DOD use?
Answer: This question became a moot point when the prime
research question and subsidiary question concerning
prime contractor methods and concern for motivating sub-




Question: What are the characteristics of the defense
industrial base at the subcontractor level?
Answer: The research 'revealed a dichotomy of characteris-
tics which cannot be summarized into a neat and orderly
package. It did become apparent that each industry is
independent and different, requiring customized incentivi-
zation efforts
.
Question: Should DOD have a flowdown policy for incentiviz-
ing subcontractors through prime contractors?
Answer: The information indicated to the researcher that
an overall DOD program should be instituted with finite
delineations in the acquisition strategy of major systems
to ensure adequate surge and mobilization capacity at the
subcontractor level. The only vehicle to effect this would





PRIME CONTRACTOR INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1. Is improving the productivity of your subcontractors a
concern? If so why, and how does that concern drive your
procurement decisions. If not, why not?
2. Would you say there is a flowdown of the profit policy
investment incentives to the subcontractor level? If so,




What methods does your company use to motivate your sub-
contractors to make productivity enhancing capital invest-
ments?
4. As a prime contractor how do you view the present profit
policy and does it have any impact on your organization?
5. Are capital investments made as a result of the profit
policy or are other criterion used? If other criterion,
what?
6. What impact have programs such as MANTECH , TECHMOD, and
IMIP had on productivity enhancing capital investments at
the prime contractor level? Do you perceive any effect on
subcontractors?
7. One keeps hearing of the eroding Defense Industrial
Base, especially at the subcontractor level. How would you
define the industrial base? Do you think the base is erod-
ing? How would you typify the erosion? Down to what level
are you concerned with the erosion (e.g., 1st tier, 2nd
tier)
?
8. Does your company have any long range commitments to
uphold the subcontractor industrial base? If so what are
they?
9. Do you think that there should be a specific policy
within DOD to require a flowdown of capital investment in-
centivization from the prime to the subcontractor?
10. As an overview statement, what is your perception of









b. 101 - 1
,
0.00
c 1,001 - 5,000
d. 5,001 - 10,000
e greater than 10,000
2. What percent of your total business (sales) is for
Government defense contracts? (include business both as
prime and subcontractor)
a less than 10%
b. 10 - 24%
c 25 - 49%
d. 50 - 74%
e greater than 75%
3. What percent of your Government defense business, as
indicated in question 2, is in the role of a subcontractor
to a prime defense contractor?
a. less than 10%
b. 10 - 24%
c. 25 - 49%
d. 50 - 74%
e. greater than 75%
4. What is the approximate annual dollar sales volume of
your Government defense business as a subcontractor to a
prime defense contractor?
a. less than $100,000
b. $100,000 - $500,000
c. $500,000 - $2,000,000
d. $2,000,000 - $5,000,000
e. greater than $5,000,000
5. The basic manufacturing process of your firm can be
described as :
a. capital intensive (e.g., machines perform a majority
of the process)
b. labor intensive (e.g., labor performs a majority of
the process)
c. balanced between labor and capital
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6. What is your standard industrial classification (SIC)
code?
7. What percent of the contracts received from prime defense
contractors are won on a competitive and noncompetive basis?
Competitive % Noncompetitive %
8. Is your company aware of the DOD profit policy and
specifically the capital investment incentivi zation portion
of the policy?
Yes No
If yes, what has been the impact on your firm? Cuse reverse
if more space is needed)
9. In the subcontract work you do for prime defense
contractors is there any effort on the primes * part to
incentivize you to invest in productivity enhancing
equipment? (if the answer is negative go to question 12)
Yes . No
10. If the answer to question nine was positive, how
effective are the prime contractors ' efforts in motivating





11. What methods do prime contractors' use to incentivize
your firm to make these productivity enhancing capital
investments? (please be as specific as possible)
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12. In your opinion, is there any interest on the prime
contractors' part concerning your continued viability as a
defense subcontractor?
Yes No
(please explain your response)
13. On what basis do you make capital investments? Please
elaborate (e.g., Return on Investment, Return on Equity) .
14 . Is your firm familiar with the concept and implementa-
tion of productivity enhancement capital investment programs
such as the Industrial Modernization Incentive Program (IMIP)
,
Manufacturing Technology (MANTECH) program, or Technology
Modernization (TECHMOD) program?
Yes No
(If yes, in what manner has one or more of these programs
affected your firm?)
15. On what basis do you measure profitability? (e.g., per-
cent of sale, return on equity, return on assets, etc.)
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16. Does- Government defense business provide the same
profitability, using your measure of profitability, as does
your commercial business?
Yes • No
17. If the answer to question 16 was negative, please
explain
.
18 . Do you see a need for prime defense contractors to
incentivize your firm to make capital investments?
(please explain)
Yes No





SUBCONTRACTOR QUESTIONNAIRE MAILING LIST
FRYER KNOWLES CO.
20 5 SOUTH DAWSON
SEATTLE, WA.
NORTHWEST TANK SERVICE
1500 AIRPORT WAY SOUTH
SEATTLE, WA.
FRASER BOILER CO.















34 33 AIRPORT WAY SOUTH
SEATTLE, WA.
EVERGREEN MOBILE














18 9 CENTURY AVE. S.W.
GRAND RAPIDS, MI 49.509
CARRIER-TRANI SCOLD CO.
A DIVISION OF CARRIER GROUP
P.O. BOX 480 5
SYRACUSE, NY 132 21
COLT INDUSTRIES OPERATION CORP
FAIRBANKS -MORSE ENGINE DIV.
701 LAWTON AVE.
BELOIT, WI 53511




P.O. BOX 404 25
7 514 ALABONSON ROAD
HOUSTON, TX 7 7088
LAKESHORE, INC.
P.O. BOX 809
IRON MOUNTAIN, MI 4 9 801
PHILADELPHIA GEAR CORP
.
181 SOUTH GULPH ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406
STEWART-WARNER ELECTRONICS














28 50 SKY WAY DRIVE
SANTA MARIA, CA 93455
AEROFLEX LABORATORIES
TORQUE MOTOR PRODUCTS DIV.
35 S. SERVICE ROAD
PLAINVIEW, NY 1180 3
AEROJET GENERAL CORP.
AEROJET STRATEGIC PROPULSION CO.
P.O. BOX 15699C
SACRAMENTO, CA 9 5813
ALL AMERICAN ENGINEERING CO.
725 DAWSON DR.
NEWARK, DE 19713
AMERICAN SCIENCE & ENGINEERING INC
FORT WASHINGTON
CAMBRIDGE, MA 2139
APPLIED SOLAR ENERGY CORP.
15 251 EAST DON JULIAN ROAD
CITY OF INDUSTRY, CA 91746
ARGO SYSTEMS INC.
884 HERMOSA






7 511 WELLINGTON RD
.





SUNNYVALE, CA 940 86
AYDIN CORP.















P.O. BOX 4 00











BETHEL, CT 6 801
CONSOLIDATED HINGE & MANUFACTURED PROD
1150-B DELL AVE.
CAMPBELL, CA 9 5008
CONTEL INFORMATION SYSTEMS
GOVERNMENT SALES DIVISION




CONTROL SYSTEMS RESEARCH DIV.





MINNEAPOLIS, MN 554 4
CONTROL DATA CORP
.
215 MOFFETT PARK DRIVE









9 233 BALBOA AVE.
SAN DIEGO, CA 92123
DATACOM INC.
INDUSTRIAL PARK
P.O. BOX 27 8
FORT WALTON BEACH, FL 32 548
DATAMETRICS CORP.








SANTA CLARA, CA 9 5051
DIGITAL EQUIPMENT CORP
555 SPARKMAN DR. SUITE 1400
HUNTSVILLE, AL 3 5 805
EAGLE PICHER INDUSTRIES INC.
ELECTRONICS DIV








NEWPORT BEACH, CA 9 2660
EG&G INC.
35 CONGRESS ST.




RICHARDSON, TX 7 5083





P.O. BOX 6 600 23
DALLAS, TX 7 5 266
FAIRCHILD CAMERA & INSTRUMENT CORP
.
COMPUTER AIDED SYSTEMS DIVISION
16 01 TECHNOLOGY DRIVE




FLOATING POINT SYSTEMS INC.
2111 LANDINGS DRIVE
MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA 94 04 3
FORD AEROSPACE & COMMUNICATIONS CORP
AERONUTRONIC DIV.
FORD RD.
NEWPORT BEACH, CA 9 26 60
FORD AEROSPACE & COMMUNICATIONS CORP
WDL DIV.
39 39 FABIAN WAY
PALO ALTO, CA 9 4 303
G AND H TECHNOLOGY
1649 - 17th ST.
SANTA MONICA, CA 90404
THE GARRETT CORPORATION
AIRESEARCH MFG. DIV.
2525 W. 190TH ST.
TORRANCE, CA 90 50 9
GENERAL DESIGN INC.
P.O. BOX 6 9









HAWTHORNE, CA 9 205
GULTON INDUSTRIES
DATA SYSTEMS DIV.













4 90 9 WEST COMPTON BLVD.
LAWNDALE, CA 9 260
HERCULES - THIOKIL - JT . VENT
BACCHUS WORKS
P.O. BOX 9 8
MAGNA , UTAH 8 4 4 4
HI-SHEAR CORP.
AD-TECH DIVISION
8 2 30 W. LOMITA BLVD.
TORRANCE, CA 9 509
HITCO
DEFENSE PRODUCTS DIV.
1600 W. 135TH ST.







GOVERNMENT AEROSPACE SYSTEMS DIVISION
P.O. BOX 94000




110 FORDHAM ROAD MS440
WILMINGTON, MA 018 8 7
HONEYWELL INC.
MILITARY AVIONICS DIVISION
P.O. BOX 889 M/S 23-3034
MINNEAPOLIS, MN 55440
HONEYWELL INC .
SPACE & STRATEGIC AVIONICS DIVISION
13350 U.S. HIGHWAY 19
CLEARWATER, FL 3 3 546
HONEYWELL INFORMATION SYSTEM
FEDERAL SYSTEMS OPERATIONS DIV.
7900 WESTPARK DRIVE
MC LEAN, VA 2 210 2
H T L INDUSTRIES INC.
H T L K-WEST DIV.
3 3 21 SOUTH FAIRVIEW AVENUE
SANTA ANA, CA 9 270 4
INTERCON SYSTEMS CORP
.
11306 E. 183RD ST.
CERRITOS, CA 90701
KAMAN INSTRUMENTATION CORP.
P.O. BOX 74 6 3
COLORADO SPRINGS, CO 809 33
KILBURN WESTERN INC.
1032 ELWELL COURT SUITE 212
PALO ALTO, CA 9 4 303
LORAL CORPORATION
90 20 BALBOA AVE.
SAN DIEGO, CA 92123
MOOG INC.
AEROSPACE GROUP
SENECA & JAMIESON ROADS








2100 E. ELLIOT RD
.
TEMPE,- AZ 8 5 282
NORDEN SYSTEMS INC.
NORDEN PLACE
P.O. BOX 5 30
NORWALK , CT 6 8 56
NORTHROP CORP.
ELECTRO - MECHANICAL DIV.
500 E. ORANGETHORPE AVE.
ANAHEIM, CA 9 280 3
OEA INC.
P.O. BOX 10488
DENVER, CO 80 210
OLIN CORPORATION
DEFENSE MARKETING
70 7 BERKSHIRE AVE.
EAST ALTON, IL 6 20 24
OWENS-CORNING FIBERGLASS GROUP
FIBERGLASS TOWER/OLEC-3
TOLEDO, OH 4 3659
PAINE INSTRUMENTS
2401 S. BAYVIEW ST.
SEATTLE, WA 9 8144
PERCEPTICS CORP
.




100 WOOSTER HEIGHTS RD
.
DANBURY, CT 06 810
PRESSURE SYSTEMS INC.
P.O. BOX 6 9 999
LOS ANGELES, CA 900 2 2
QUANTIC INDUSTRIES INC.
990 COMMERCIAL
SAN CARLOS, CA 940 70
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RACAL COMMUNICATIONS INC.
5 RESEARCH PLACE .
ROCKVILLE, MD 20 8 50.
REYNOLDS INDUSTRIES INC.
5Q05 MC CONNELL AVE.
LOS ANGELES, CA 9.0 06 6
ROLM CORP
.
MSC DIVISION: MAIL STOP 130
ONE RIVER OAKS PL
SAN JOSE, CA 95134
SCIENTIFIC ATLANTA INC.
ELECTRO PRODUCTS DIVISION
384 5 PLEASANTDALE ROAD





12 50 GLADSTONE AVENUE
SYLMAR, CA 9134 2
SPERRY CORPORATION
FLIGHT SYSTEMS DIV.
21111 NO. 19TH AVE.
PHOENIX, AZ 85027
STADCO
19 31 NORTH BROADWAY
LOS ANGELES, CA 9 00 31
STANFORD TELECOMMUNICATIONS INC
2421 MISSION COLLEGE BLVD.






SUNDSTRAND ENERGY SYSTEMS DIV.
4 74 7 HARRISON AVENUE
ROCKFORD, IL 61101
105
SUNDSTRAND DATA CONTROL INC.
OVERLAKE INDUSTRIAL PARK
REDMOND, WA 980 5 2
SYSTEMS CONTROL TECHNOLOGY INC
1801 PAGE MILL ROAD




CONCORD, CA 9 4 518
THORN EMI TECHNOLOGY INC.
86 01 DUNWOOD PL.
ATLANTA, GA 30 3 38
TRANSCO PRODUCTS INC.
4 241 GLENCOE AVE.
VENICE, CA 90291
UNIDYNAMICS PHOENIX INC.
P.O. BOX 29 90
PHOENIX, AX 85062
CREST PRODUCTS CORP.
2000 S . SUSAN ST.
SANTA ANA, CA 9 2 704
GOAL CHEMICAL SEALANTS CORP.
3137 E. 26TH STREET
LOS ANGELES, CA 90023
CAL-WIRE STRANDING COMPANY
3200 EST SLAUSON AVENUE







FORT WALTON BEACH, FL 3 2 549




AAA BRASS FOUNDRY, INC.
22 7 5 JERROLD AVE.
SAN FRANCISCO, CA 94124
COLORADO FORGE CORPORATION
327 W. VERMIJO
COLORADO SPRINGS, CO 8Q903
MATTCO FORGE INC.
16443 MINNESOTA AVE.
PARAMOUNT, CA 90 723
DATA SCIENCE
1189 ODDSTAD DRIVE








SANTA CLARA, CA 9 50 50
SAUCEDO METAL PRODUCTS, INC.
1596 SOUTH 7TH STREET
SAN JOSE, CA 95112
ANCHOR INDUSTRIES INC.
5031 NO. FIGUEROA ST.
LOS ANGELES, CA 9 0042
APPLIED ELECTRO TECHNOLOGY, INC
2220 SOUTH ANNE STREET
SANTA ANA, CA 9 270 4




6 34 NATIONAL AVE.
MOUNTAIN VIEW, CA 94043
CENTURY ELECTRONICS
596 5 WASHINGTON BLVD.
CULVER CITY, CA 90230
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ENGINEERED CONTROL SYSTEMS, INC
ONE KELLY COURT
MENLO PARK, CA 9.4025




562 WEDDELL DR., SUITE 5
SUNNYVALE, CA 9 4086
TEMPCO ELECTRIC HEATER CORP.
36 30 NO. WOLF RD
.
FRANKLIN PARK, IL 60131
APPLIED DETECTOR CORP.
2325 E. MCKINLEY AVE.
FRESNO, CA 9 3 703
ATLANTIC-PACIFIC CIRCUITS
















LARGO, FL 3 3 543
MAURY MICROWAVE CORP.
8610 HELMS AVENUE
CUCAMONGA, CA 917 30
MICROWAVE RESEARCH CORP.
14 29 OSGOOD STREET
NORTH ANDOVER, MA 918 4 5
ROSAN, INC.
2901 COAST HIGHWAY
NEWPORT BEACH, CA 926 60
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SPACE-LOK INC.
2526 NORTH ONTARIO STREET
BURBANK, CA 9.150 4
DUROYD MFG. CO., INC.
10 KIMBALL PLACE
MOUNT VERNON, NY 10.5 50
UNITED SEAL & RUBBER CO.
2980-J PINE STREET
DECATUR, GA 30 30
ARRAL INDUSTRIES INC.
16 30 SHEARWATER ST.
ONTARIO, CA 91761
HUNTLEY MACHINE & TOOL, INC.
4 6 23 7TH AVENUE SOUTH
SEATTLE, WA 9 810 8
PEREZ MACHINE, INC.
2110 GLADWICK STREET
COMPTON, CA 90 2 20
AIR HARBOR MACHINE COMPANY, INC
21611 PERRY STREET
CARSON, CA 90 74 5
APARTAMIL, CORPORATION
15370 CHOLAME 9 & 10
VICTORVILLE, CA 92392
STANDARD TOOL & DIE
19 31 NORTH BROADWAY
LOS ANGELES, CA 900 31
DELS GENERAL MACHINE COMPANY
6 30 8 DALE AVENUE
BUENA PARK, CA 90 6 20
MACKMANES ENTERPRISES, INC.
2940 EAST MIRALOMA AVENUE
ANAHEIM, CA 9 280 6
NOTTHOFF ENGINEERING, INC.
15651 CONTAINER LANE















1946 WEST 144TH ST.
GARDENA, CA 9 249
AUTOMATED MACHING, INC.
2615 N.W. UPSHUR
PORTLAND, OR 9 7210
CHASE-WALTON ELASTOMERS, INC





MARVIN ENGINEERING CO., INC.
260 SEST BEACH AVENUE
INGLEWOOD, CA 9 302
GRAPHIC RESEARCH, INC.
9 3 34 MASON AVENUE
CHATSWORTH, CA 91311
PREMA ENGINEERING
914 5 OWENSMOUTH AVENUE
CHATSWORTH, CA 91311
INSTRUMENT MACHINING
1726 NORTH TYLER STREET
SOUTH EL MONTE, CA 917 33
ALL FAB, INC.
BLD. C-19 PAINE FIELD
EVERETT, WA 9 8 204
MULTIWIRE WEST
39 01 EAST LAPALMA




SAN JOSE, CA 95112
L & S MACHINE COMPANY




BUILDING C27, SNOHOMISH COUNTY AIRPORT
P.O. BOX 142
LYNWOOD, WA 9 80 36
ELECTRO-MODULE, INC.
3 501 HARBOR BLVD.
COSTA MESA, CA 926 26
HONEYWELL TEST INSTRUMENTS DIVISION
4 80 EAST DRY CREEK ROAD
DENVER, CO 80 217








6130 31ST AVENUE N.E.
P.O. BOX 39
MARYSVILLE, WA 9 8 270
BOUSE MANUFACTURING COMPANY
2901 SOUTH CRODDY WAY
SANTA ANA, CA 9 2 704
CERTIFIED MANUFACTURING COMPANY, INC.
SANDERSON FIELD
SHELTON, WA 9 8 584
WITKO ENGINEERING
1518 WEST ROSECRANS






19.6 0.1 NORDHOFF STREET
NORTHRIDGE, CA 9-13 2 4
ASTRONAUTICS CORPORATION OF AMERICA
907 SOUTH FIRST STREET
MILWAUKEE, WI 53 20 4
TAYCO
441 EAST 4TH STREET
LONG BEACH, CA 90 802
GENERAL MICROWAVE CORPORATION
155 MARINE STREET
FARMINGDALE, LONG ISLAND, NY 11735
NURAD CORPORATION
2165 DRUID PARK DRIVE
BALTIMORE, MD 21211
EAGLE PICHER


























4141 EASTERN AVENUE SE
GRAND RAPIDS, MI 49508
TALLEY INDUSTRIES OF ARIZONA
4551 EAST MCKELLIPS ROAD
MESA, AZ 85201
TELEDYNE CAST PRODUCTS
4 200 WEST VALLEY BLVD.
P.O. BOX 2 34 8
POMONA, CA 917 6 6
TRACOR/MB ASSOC.
HIGHLAND INDUSTRIAL PARK
EAST CAMDEN, AR 71701
GOULD INC.
SEL COMPUTING SYSTEMS DIVISION
6901 WEST SUNRISE BLVD.
FORT LAUDERDALE, FL 3 3313
MOLINAS SHEET METAL COMPANY
14700 INDUSTRY CIRCLE
LA MIRADA, CA 90638
NORTH ATLANTIC INDUSTRIES, INC
60 PLANT AVENUE
HAUPPAUGE, NY 117 8 7
RACAL DANA INSTRUMENTS INC.
4 GOODYEAR STREET
IRVINE, CA 9 2713
REX PRECISION PRODUCTS, INC.
14 8 31 MAPEL AVENUE
GARDENA, CA 90 24 7
ROTEK INCORPORATED
1400 CHILLOCOTHE ROAD
AURORA, OH 4 4 202
SAGE LABORATORIES, INC.
3 HURON DIRVE
NATICK, MA 017 6
SPAULDING FIBER
1300 SOUTH 7TH STREET




16 8 30 WEST PLACERITA CANYON ROAD
NEWHALL, CA 913 21
SEATS, INC.
3 50 NORTH DEWEY
P.O. BOX 6
REEDSBURG, WI 5 39 59.
HOLEX INC.






KAISER ALUMINUM & CHEMICAL CORP.
ERIE WORKS







59 9 NORTH MAJODA AVENUE
SUNNYVALE, CA 9 4086
LEBANON STEEL CASTINGS
101 EAST LEHMAN STREET
LEBANON, PA 17042
MASON ELECTRIC COMPANY
440 LOS FELIZ ROAD
GLENDALE, CA 9 210 4
AIRCRAFT POROUS MEDIA
6 301 4 9TH STREET NORTH







59.6 5 WASHINGTON BLVD.
CULVER CITY, CA 90230.
DUNCAN EQUIPMENT INC.
180.0 PEYCO DRIVE SOUTH
ARLINGTON, TX 76017
ELGAR CORPORATION
822 5 MERCURY COURT
SAN DIEGO, CA 92111
FLEXIBLE CIRCUITS INC.
PAUL VALLEY INDUSTRIAL PARK
WORRINGTON, PA 189 76
GOEX, INC.
4 23 VAUGHN ROAD WEST





RENTON COIL SPRING COMPANY
325 BURNETT AVENUE NORTH
P.O. BOX 328
RENTON, WA 980 57
MIFFLIN MACHINE




FORT LEE, NJ 07024
AMERICAN METAL BEARING CO.
7191 ACACIA AVENUE





P.O. BOX 98 5
4 90 BROADWAY
BUFFALO, NY 14 24
115
CARRIER TRANSICOLD CO.
P.O. BOX 4 80 5
SYRACUSE, NY 13221
CARVER PUMP CO.




NEWPORT BEACH, CA 9.26 6 3
COLT INDUSTRIES OPERATING CORP.






180 9 CENTURY AVENUE S.W.
GRAND RAPIDS, MI 49509
DRESSER INDUSTRIES, INC.
ROOTS BLOWER OPERATIONS





4625 NORTH 30TH STREET







J. J. HENRY CO. , INC.
WEST PARK DRIVE
MT. LAUREL INDUSTRIAL PARK
MOORESTOWN, NJ 80 57
JERED BROWN BROS., INC.





P.O. BOX 4 0.Q1Q
9.70.0 WEST GULF BANK DRIVE
HOUSTON, TX 77040
LAKESHORE, INC.
P.O. BOX 80 9





181 SOUTH GULPH ROAD
KING OF PRUSSIA, PA 19406
RIX INDUSTRIES
6460 HOLLIS STREET
EMERYVILLE, CA 9460 8
STEWART-WARNER ELECTRONICS DIVISION
STEWART-WARNER CORP.
1300 N. KOSTNER AVENUE
CHICAGO, IL 60651
TANO CORPORATION
4301 POCHE COURT WEST
NEW ORLEANS, LA 7012 9
THE L.C. DOANE CO.







114 9 WEST ANDOVER PARK
SEATTLE, WA 9 818 8
UNIDYNAMICS/ST. LOUIS, INC.
472 PAUL AVENUE
ST. LOUIS, MO 63135
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VARO, INC.
2203 WEST WALNUT STREET
P.O. BOX 4 014 2 6
GARLAND , TX 7 5 4
WORTHINGTON GROUP
MCGRAW-EDISON CO.
P.O. BOX 6 9
BUFFALO, NY 14 24
WALWORTH
115 SHAWMUT RD.








1. Do you think "Profit Policy" is a motivator for capital
investment?
2. In your opinion, are prime contractors concerned with
motivating subcontractors to make productivity enhancing
capital investments?
3. Do you perceive a decline in the subcontractor industrial
base?
4. Do you see a need for the DOD to be concerned with moti
vating subcontractors to make investments or should market
forces prevail?
5. What methods would you recommend for capital investment
incentivization of subcontractors other than profit policy?
6. Are there any initiatives or ongoing programs within DOD
to improve subcontractor productivity and reduce long lead
times for critical materials with which you are familiar?
7. As an overview, how do you currently use the industrial
base and what efforts should be made to improve the base?
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APPENDIX E
SURVEY NARRATIVE QUESTION COMPILATION
FIRMS/DIVISIONS WHO ARE SUBCONTRACTORS GREATER THAN 7 5%
OF THE TIME
8 . Is your company aware of the DOD Profit Policy and
specifically the capital investment incentivization portion
of the policy? (If yes, what has been the impact on your
firm)
* Share of Savings
.
* Weighted guidelines and CAS 414 applied in pricing
calculations
* None of any consequence, the CAS 414 enables partial
recovery of corporate interest charges on negotiated con-
tracts .
* Occasionally use WGL as a tool in our fee negotiations.
Policies have been established to ensure careful considera-
tion of costs and benefits associated with capital invest-
ment and related DOD compensations.
* No Significant Impact
* Nothing Positive
* Impacts us only indirectly in that it provides for im-
proved profits and profit is the source of capital
investments
.
11. What methods do prime contractors use to incentivize
your firm to make these productivity enhancing capital
investments?
* Cooperative teams investigate processes for cost
reductions
* Guaranteed rate of production and larger percentage of
dual source production
The potential for production programs as a follow on to
FSD typically has the greatest impact on decisions to invest
in new capital.
* Combined efforts on R&D projects
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* Essentially only one -- Competition
* Mild encouragements on an "as appropriate" basis during
routine business
* One prime purchased the equipment for us . Other prime
is considering purchasing for us or might commit to long
term orders as an incentive instead.
* Interested in our reliability, and unique ability
(time, price and performance) to stated needs.




12. In your opinion, is there any interest on the prime
contractors 1 part concerning your continued viability as a
defense subcontractor. (Please explain your response)
* In recent years the mood of the primes is to try and
create a feeling of partnership and closer relations to
assure dependable long term commitment.
* To provide spares.
* Primarily to insure that dependable reliable and
competitive sources are available in the future to support
program needs
.
* Our products must generally be qualified by extensive
destruction testing. Once the product is qualified the
cost of qualifying an alternate product gives the prime a
very strong economic incentive in our survival.
25% of our products are qualified to the contractors'
specifications and have non-recurring engineering costs
which they would need to duplicate if we did not exist,
either by furnishing build-to-print drawings or by purchasing
a new design.
As a qualified source with good quality and delivery
history effort is made to maintain our support of critical
programs
.
* Primarily to provide multiple potential procurement
sources
.
* We are a significant volume sub in our own right in
addition to being a partner in a joint venture with years of
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defense experience/involvement. We've developed a close
working relationship with our primes and they value our
capabilities
.
* Prime interest seems to be price.
* We provide a product and service which is available
only from a very limited number of firms throughout the
world. Our viability is therefore vital within the defense
contracting market.
* Customers often visit us to try and resolve problems
so that price and delivery impacts are not so great that they
would exclude us in future operations
.
* In some instances a particular subcontract manager or
program manager from a selfish point of view. But, never
a coordinated or structured effort.
Generally, no. However, in specific instances the
prime or Navy is interested in our special capabilities
.
Our facilities at present have no equal in the U.S.
* Primes require on-time delivery of high quality com-
petitively priced, state-of-the-art equipment which will
be supported for long time periods. We fulfill this need,
thus our customers know they can count on us and want us to
continue as a defense subcontractor.
* We are the requisite technology on at least one program.
* Business transactions are based on each party's indivi-
dual interests and the best deal for each procurement action.
Primes are definitely interested in maintaining dependable
vendors who produce quality products, and in fact will be
in business tomorrow.
14. Is your firm familiar with the concept and implementa-
tion of productivity enhancement capital investment programs
such as IMIP, MANTECH, or TECHMOD programs? (If yes, in
what manner has one or more of these programs affected your
firm)
* Currently in discussion stage.
* Just recently offered -- no impact to date.
* Not enough people to implement.
* None in the division (elsewhere in corporation such
programs are being considered)
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* No effect. These programs are normally utilized on
much larger firms who are engaged in more capital intensive
manufacturing
.
* A business planning group has been formulated and this
is one area of interest which they are pursuing.
* Phase 1 MANTECH for F-16 — No effect yet.
* None significantly to date since we recently agreed to
participate in the GD/Fort Worth program.
* We made a proposal to participate in TECHMOD . Prime
did not choose to proceed with us, since we were not
awarded a contract in a competitive procurement.
17. If the answer to Question 15 was negative please
explain. (16. Does government defense business provide
the same profitability, using your measure of profitability,
as does your commercial business?)
* On occasion less profitable because of stringent
standards. Otherwise, profitability is about on par with
commercial products of the same type.
* Government only allows 10% profit.
* Profit is limited.
* Government (DAR & FAR) regulations contain certain
disallowables which never-the-less make up our cost of doing
business
.
Because of progress payments interest expense is
disallowed when in fact we must pay for borrowed money even
in most cases to finance a government order. Allowed profit
percentages are too low to absorb the difference. It is
very difficult to purchase capital equipment and expect to
maintain existing equipment without paying interest on
borrowed money needed to finance the new equipment. Maximum
profit percents negotiated are 10% and interest on money is
15-16%.
Audits by government doesn't recognize the cost of
money; usually knocks down burden rates; usually knocks
down profit allowance.
* Certain commercial contracts are much more profitable
but some tend to be short term and small volume.
* With the dominant factor being price, and the increased
involvement of additional agencies (DCAS, DCAA, etc.) it is
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impossible in our view to compare profits in defense business
with normal commercial activity.
Government profit policies limit the maximum profit
regardless of contractors' risk. Some of our commercial
customers require short lead times which require our main-
taining large inventories of complete end component parts.
For this service, they are willing to pay higher profits.
* It costs considerably more money to do business with
the Government or Government primes . They impose more
requirements (e.g., source inspection, DD 250s, audits,
countless regulations, etc.) . Also profit (as a percentage
of total cost) is restricted.
Our strategic plan no longer considers commercial
business
.
Defense business and particularly Navy business has at
best been marginally profitable. We are generally involved
as a subcontractor at the first or second tier level and
work on a FFP basis where the customer may in fact be work-
ing with a CPFF or similiar contract. If our estimates
are wrong or problems develop increasing our internal cost,
we are pretty much stuck without any way to recover the
costs. We are a firm that does a relatively small amount
of Govenrment work and do not maintain staff dedicated to
administering such contracts
.
Government business does not allow for all cost to be
recovered. Government personnel negotiate most of the
business and will not allow higher profit rates which
commercial business allows.
* The Government profit policies do no adequately reward
innovation since price is a function of cost.
"Financial Accounting" and "Government Accounting" of
profitability differs in at least one respect - the
inclusion and/or exclusion of debt service. Debt service,
unfortunately, seems to have to be carried as a burden by
other divisions in order for the desired financial profita-
bility goals and in some cases, the market place does not
allow this excess burden. Commercial profitability is
measured against sales as a percent and government profits
is a percent of cost - not to exceed rate.
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18. Do you see a need for prime defense contractors to
incentivize your firm to make capital investment? (Please
explain your response)
* Yes. Increase production and lower costs.
* No. Competition is sufficient.
* No. As previously stated the probability of production
follow-on is the best incentive for capital investment.
* Yes . Would help us in determining the equipment that
will be most useful in our operation.
* Yes. Small aerospace job shops are vital to the
national defense of our country.
* Yes. In order to allow small business to expand they
must purchase new equipment and hire and train new people.
No Government contractor or DCAA auditor will allow these
kinds of costs when in some cases they (the costs) do not
apply directly to the contract they are auditing for.
* Yes. It should yield growth opportunities and financial
aid in achieving that growth.
* Yes. It would be helpful, however, the need for
capital investment is generally dictated by actual need and
obvious necessity.
* Yes. Generally speaking, production costs often remain
high due to "short term" motivation to maximize return on
assets and net profitability at the expense of updating
plant facility and equipment.
* Yes. However, the Government is pulling the strings
and the primes can only pass along that latitude in incen-
tives granted them from above.
* No. Prime contractors are in no way aware of the
problems or future needs of a small company such as ours.
* Yes . Without question -- With the Government expecting
a low profit margin there remains little incentive for
capital improvement to lower costs in a small company like
ours
.
* I guess it depends on the incentive. It must go beyond
the concept of capital cost of money which is given with
one hand and taken back with the other.
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* Yes. DOD contractors demand higher reliability and
quality but do not incentivize capital equipment upgrade
or investment.
* Yes. Every effort should be made by the Government
directly or through its ' primes to provide incentives to
enhance our continued profitability and growth. We must
achieve profit margins which will permit us to continue
our efforts in the government sector. More often than not,
buyers tend to negotiate the lowest possible profit without
regard to the Governments overall policy of reasonable
profit and return.
* Yes . To the extent that they also share in the same
incentive. Incentives, which in principle, sound good, in
practice seem very difficult to implement with todays multi-
tude of regulations, and in fact, competition.
* No. The decision to make capital investments is based
on many variables . Prime contractors cannot effectively
direct the capital investment needs of a supplier. The
procurement practices of the Government tend to discourage
investments because of the short term (yearly) procurement
cycles that Government contracts follow. In order to justi-
fy major capital investments, long term commitments are




FIRM/DIVISION DOD BUSINESS AS A SUBCONTRACTOR IS LESS
THAN 7 5% BUT GREATER THAN 10%
8. Is your company aware of the DOD Profit Policy and
specifically the capital investment incentivization portion




_ Has allowed for more capital investment generally.
* Small impact as the policy is not one that identifies
significant amounts that are realistically recognized by
DOD or NASA procurement personnel. Weighted guidelines are
of little help.
* Negligible
Little. Substantial investment in machinery and test
equipment, which is not required, would be needed to make
any significant impact in profit policy.
* No impact other than cost of money for facilities
capital
.
* No impact at present time, however, we are currently
evaluating our present position to determine advantages
and/or disadvantages.
Our Government (Navy) product line is given favorable
consideration respecting capital investment.
* Very little. As with all profit policies to date
"bottom line" price becomes the driver.
11. What methods do prime contractors use to incentivize
your firm to make these productivity enhancing capital
investments?
* Competitive nature of business and desire to maintain
position on major programs generally require a high level of
production efficiency. Often we must commit to production
prices which can only be achieved through capital invest-
ments to reduce labor intensity in order to assure our
competitive position on such programs
.
They describe tasks which we could compete on if
specific capital equipment was in place.
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* Share of Savings
.
Potential of greater numbers to be built. This based
on number of vessels, number of units required.
12. In your opinion, is there any interest on the prime
contractors' part concerning your continued viability as a
defense subcontractor? (Please explain your response)
* Any concerns which exist at the prime level seems to be
related to their ability to remain a viable defense contract-
or, and they are interested in us only as we affect their
performance
.
* Primes view the problem only for themselves . Subcon-
tract management personnel do not appreciate subcontractor
problems
.
In general our prime contractors are satisfied with our
equipment and desire to continue using us as a source for
future defense business.
* We offer technology which is unique.
* My impression is that we're too small for the prime to
take a sincere interest.
* They survey our capacity and capabilities in some cases
prior to award of contracts. Also assist in tech and
engineering as required.
We are one of five primary producers in our field of
technology and provide some unique capabilities for some
products
* Most primes we deal with have major long term weapons
contracts, therefore they want long term support, e.g.,
technology/capability
Only when you can make them more competitive or have
skill required that they don't currently possess.
In most cases, due to a very small number of companies
performing the type of work we do, the loss of one competitor
could place the prime in a situation of sole source procure-
ment on a critical component.
It seems to be "If you can't do it at our price we will
find someone who can"
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* Most of the primes, take a rather benevolent attitude
toward small business subcontractors- Probably motivated by
self interest due to inexperienced subcontractors, the primes
are trying to avoid heavy handed dealings which result in
delays, disputes ^terminations , etc. Once a subcontractor
is judged stable and reliable primes seem mainly motivated
by delivery, price and quality.
* We are well known for high tech capabilities among
Government and prime contractors. They do recognize the
need for competition and for contractors/subcontractors who
perform.
* Only if you can meet all his requirements at a price he
can negotiate downward. Not always in the best interest of
the company
.
* Generally they recognize the advantage of having a
healthy subcontractor base.
* They need competition when they are bidding prime con-
tracts. In addition, the prime depends on his subcontract-
ors for quality and "on-time" performance so his schedules
and costs are controlled.
* To the extent competition is needed to make the prime
competitive
* Many shipbuilding programs would result in substantial
costs to the shipyard (prime) if they had to change vendors
halfway through a program.
* Limited number of potential suppliers
.
14. Is your firm familiar with the concept and implementa-
tion of productivity enhancement capital investment programs
such as IMIP, MANTECH, or TECHMOD programs? (If yes, in
what manner has one or more of these programs affected your
firm)
* Have one Government contract
.
* We are currently studying possible areas for utiliza-
tion of an IMIP agreement. with NAVAIR.
* Not conclusive, since we have had an aggressive capital
program for several years to build a new plant. MANTECH or
IMIP may accelerate modernization of the older plant.
* Familiar with programs but have not participated in
them at this time.
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Opportunities, to participate in these programs have
only recently been afforded to us.
No effect. Getting involved, approved, paper filed, etc
Finding out who, what, and where is too involved, trouble-
some and not worth the effort. It takes a cost of thousands
to get any of these programs going The best way is to
do it without Government involvement! It's faster and
cheaper
.
17. If the answer to Question 16 was negative please explain
(16. Does Government defense business provide the same
profitability, using your measure of profitability, as does
your commercial business?)
* The structure and requirements on Government contracts
provide less flexibility in program implementation. An
example is : Commercial contracts can take advantage of the
latest technological developments , Government contracts often
require additional testing and justification.
* Prices to the Government are depressed below commercial
prices, due to bids on large quantities on annual basis.
* Government has a cap of 12%.
* Currently return on Government work is acceptable
because commercial side has been hurting. When commercial
markets are good - return is much better.
Statutory limits are placed on profit in Government
business
.
Government work offers lower profits, however, in
general the volume is greater.
Limitation of DCASMA and DCAA including losses due to
competition of holding on in the market place results in
none if any profit from products from industry.
Margins on commercial products are higher. Products
are developed privately and priced based upon market
conditions
.
Commercial business is very competitive and does not
concern itself with how much profit you make or quote, etc.,
Government business, even when highly competitive gets upset
with profit factors greater than 8%.
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* DAR/FAR and NASA profit limitations plus, the allowable
cost and restriction on secret costs which is now e-xistent
in the commercial market.
Lower percent profit on sales but generally higher on
return on investment.
Government defense business usually has hidden amounts
of administrative costs which are not reflected in the
pricing, therefore less profit on defense business.
* Couldn't compete at the same level - Navy or Government
work highly competitive - Pricing is major determining factor
in making a sale -- Many jobs taken at cost or even less --
No profit.
Defense contractors are tightly controlled. Being
"first or best" in a defense market does not necessarily
increase profits.
* Frequently it does not when you factor in the G&A the
Government does not accept (interest, Government salespeople,
etc.,) otherwise it's about the same.
* Usually labor (engineering) intensive. Quantities
small. Combination leads to poor dollar return based on
effort required.
* Government guidelines, audits, specifications, standards,
and reviews restrict profit and/or margin by increasing
operating costs.
18. Do you see a need for prime defense contractors to
incentivize your firm to make capital investment? (Please
explain your response)
We don't see how it would work at this point. We've
bought new equipment on our own, as we've seen the need.
What kind of incentives could they provide?
* Yes. Must recognize in profit negotiations and look at
IMIP type contracting.
Yes. Small business subcontractors must be assisted to
enable them to make the necessary capital investments to
remain viable in the inudstry. Ordinarily pay-out is too
long for small business to capitalize much equipment. If it
were incentivized per unit prices to the prime and ultimately
the Government would drop.
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* Yes. In today's market we must see the work prior to
investment to minimize risk of capital funds.
* Yes. If a defense contractor is incentivized in their
prime contract they should also flowdown the provision in
their subcontracts
.
* Yes. To the extent needed to meet the primes
objectives
.
* Yes. Selfishly, it almost insures a vested interest by
the prime, hence a more long term relationship can be
developed. Future/ongoing business is probably a bottom line
incentive for small business concerns.
* Yes. If the contracts can justify the capital
investment
* Yes. If programs were flexible, since technologies,
program requirements and companies create widely varying
needs
.
* Yes. The large primes generally have contracts that
allow them to take advantage of capital investment programs
.
However, there is very little pass through to the
subcontractors
.
* Yes. It would reduce cost for certain large or long
term programs (5 years or more) . However, it must be more
specifically defined and make profit incentive relate to
the amount of documented investment.
* Yes. The dichotomy is simply if we invest in capital
improvements will we be in a better position to capture the
competitive procurement for the next fiscal year or will we
obligate ourselves and due to a declining commercial market,
find our competition dropping the price to unacceptably low
level to capture the business. Multi-year procurements seem
to be an easy and workable solution to provide stability.
* Yes. Only where the program is large enough to offer
significant inducements for such investment.
* Yes. We, like most business firms, will make capital
investments where there are opportunities to compete for





Yes. Only if they could guarantee orders if we indeed
a capital investment.
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* No. Unless some very specialized investments are
required for a particular product or contract.
* Yes. In certain instances with adequate advanced study
and inputs from the subcontractor. However, blanket
imposition of incentive programs could tend to increase
subcontractor burden.
* No. We offer competitive bids for most jobs we book.
If we cannot compete then another firm will win. It is then
up to us to make our firm more competitive. It is no
business of either a prime or Government.
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FIRMS/DIVISIONS WITH LESS THEN 10.% SUBCONTRACT DOD BUSINESS
12. In your opinion, is there any interest on the prime
contractors ' part concerning your continued viability as a
defense subcontractor?
* The prime has his own problems, he has not time or
inclination to be concerned with the productivity of some
small subcontractor. The only time he becomes interested in
such things is when the subcontractor is an important single
source
.
* As much as I like to get defense contracts I find it
very difficult to cut through the red tape.
* Because they only look at prices they pay for parts
.
17. If the answer to Question 16 was negative please explain
(16. Does Government defense business provide the same
profitability using your measure of profitability as does
your commercial business?
* The only prime contract ever issued by Washington re-
quired full disclosure of all financial aspects of the
project, thus profit was set as a percentage of sales price
by Government regulation.
* The competitive nature of the subcontract letting pro-
cedure keep this from happening. We (subcontractors) are all
bidding against ourselves.
* Companies must have state-of-the-art equipment to do
Government work and low paid labor base. Even with the
above conditions it is hard to get Government work.
* Usually labor (engineering) intensive. Quantities




Do you see a need for prime defense contractors to
incentivize your firm to make capital investments?
* The existing facilities can and do accomodate volumes
of product many times the volume required by defense
contractors
.
* We need the positive pressure they can exert - it's a
forcing function which would be beneficial to all parties.
We seldom take the time or have the necessary human resources
to look at ourselves.
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* I would rather see the Government look for more in a
company than price alone, i.e., quality control, standard,
on-time delivery, etc. Let the manager of the company
make capital investment decisions as business increases .
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FIRMS/DIVISION WHOSE TOTAL DOD BUSINESS IS GREATER THAN 75%
8. Is your company aware of the DOD Profit policy and
specifically the capital investment incentivization portion
of the policy? (.If yes, what has been the impact on your
firm?)
* Share of Savings.
* Weighted guidelines and CAS 414 applied in pricing
calculations
* None of any consequence, the CAS 414 enables partial
recovery of corporate interest charges on negotiated
contracts
.
* Occasionally use WGL as a tool in our fee negotiations .
Policies have been established to ensure careful considera-
tion of costs and benefits associated with capital invest-
ment and related DOD compensations.
* Very little
* Has allowed for more capital investment generally.
* Negligible
* Small impact as the policy is not one that identifies
significant amounts that are realistically recognized by
DOD or NASA procurement personnel. Weighted guidelines is
of little help.
* No significant impact




11. What methods do prime contractors use to incentivize
your firm to make these productivity enhancing capital
investments?
Guaranteed rate of production and larger pecentage of
dual source production
* The potential for production programs as a follow on to
FSD typically has the greatest impact on decisions to invest
in new capital.
136
* Combined efforts on R&D projects
* Essentially only one -- Competition
* Mild encouragements on an "as appropriate" basis during
routine business
* One prime purchased the equipment for us . Other prime
is considering purchasing for us or might commit, to long
term orders as an incentive instead
.
* Interested in our reliability, and unique ability
(time, price and performance), to stated needs.
* They describe tasks which we could compete on if speci-
fic capital equipment was in place.
12. In your opinion, is there any interest on the prime
contractors' part concerning your continued viability as a
defense subcontractor? (Please explain your response)
* To provide spares
.
* Primarily to insure that dependable reliable and com-
petitive sources are available in the future to support
program needs
.
* Our products must generally be qualified by extensive
destruction testing. Once the product is qualified the
cost of qualifying an a.lternate product gives the prime a
very strong economic incentive in our survival.
* Twenty five (25) percent of our products are qualified
to the contractors ' specifications and have non-recurring
engineering costs which they would need to duplicate if we
did not exist, either by furnishing build-to-print drawings
or by purchasing a new design.
As a qualified source with good quality and delivery
history effort is made to maintain our support of critical
programs
.
We are a significant volume sub in our own right in
addition to being a partner in a joint venture with years
of defense experience/involvement. We've developed a close
working relationship with our primes and they value our
capabilities
.
* Customers often visit us to try and resolve problems so
that price and delivery impacts are not so great that they
would exclude us in future operations
.
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In some ins.tances. a particular subcontract manager or
program manager from a selfish point of view. But, never a
coordinated or structured effort.
Primes view the problem only for themselves. Subcontract
management personnel do not appreciate subcontractor problems
* We offer technology which is unique.
My impression is that we're too small for the prime to
take a sincere interest.
* Most primes we deal with have major long term weapons
contracts, therefore they want long term support, e.g.,
technology/capability
.
Only when you can make them more competitive or have
skill required that they don't currently possess.
It seems to be "If you can't do it at our price we will
find someone who can"
* Most of the primes take a rather benevolent attitude
toward small business subcontractors. Probably motivated
by self interest due to inexperienced subcontractors, the
primes are trying to avoid heavy handed dealings which re-
sult in delays, disputes, terminations, etc Once a
subcontractor is judged stable and reliable primes seem
mainly motivated by delivery, price and quality.
* Primes require on-time delivery of high quality com-
petitively priced, state-of-the-art equipment which will
be supported for long time periods. We fulfill this need,
thus our customers know they can count on us and want to
continue as a defense subcontractor.
* Primes are definitely interested in maintaining depend-
able vendors who produce quality products, and in fact will
be in business tomorrow.
14. Is your firm familiar with the concept and implementation
of productivity enhancement capital investment programs such
as IMIP, MANTECH, or TECHMOD programs? (If yes, in what
manner has one or more of these programs affected your firm?)
* Just recently offered -- No impact to date
* None in the division (elsewhere in corporation such
programs are being considered)
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* No effect. These programs are normally utilized on
much larger firms who are engaged in more capital intensive
manufacturing
.
* A business planning group has been formulated and this
is one of interest which they are pursuing.
* Familiar with programs but have not participated in them
at this time.
* None significantly to date since we recently agreed to
participate in the GD/Fort Worth program.
* Phase 1 MANTECH for F-16 — No effect yet.
No effect. Getting involved, approved, paper filed,
etc. Finding out who, what, and where is too involved,
troublesome and not worth the effort. It takes a cost of
thousands to get any of these programs going... the best way
is to do it without Government involvement!! It's faster
and cheaper
.
17. If the answer to question 16 was negative please explain
(16. Does Government defense business provide the same
profitability, using your measure of profitability, as does
your commercial business?)
* Government only allows 10% profit.
* Government (DAR & FAR) regulations contain certain
disallowables which never-the-less make up our cost of
doing business.
* Because of progress payments interest expense is dis-
allowed when in fact we must pay for borrowed money even
in most cases to finance a Government order. allowed pro-
fit percentages are too low to absorb the difference. It
is very difficult to purchase capital equipment and expect
to maintain existing equipment without paying interest on
borrowed money needed to finance the new equipment. Maximum
profit percents negotiated are 10% and interest on money is
15-16%.
* Certain commercial contracts are much more profitable
but some tend to be short term and small volume.
* Our strategic plan no longer considers commercial
business
.
* Government has a cap of 12%.
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* Currently return on Government work is acceptable
because commercial side has heen hurting. When commercial
markets are good - return is much better.
* Government work offers lower profits, however, in
general the volume is greater.
Limitation of DCASMA and DCAA including losses due to
competition of holding on in the market place results in
none if any profit from products for industry.
Commercial business is very competitive and does not
concern itself with how much profit you make or quote etc....
Government business, even when highly competitive gets upset
with profit factors greater than 8%.
* DAR/FAR and NASA profit limitations plus the allowable
cost and restriction on secret costs which is non existent
in the commercial market.
* Government business does not allow for all cost to be
recovered. Government personnel negotiate most of the
business and will not allow higher profit rates which
commercial business allows.
* Government guidelines, audits, specifications, standards,
and reviews restrict profit and/or margin by increasing
operating costs
.
* "Financial accounting" and "Government accounting" of
profitability differs in at least one respect - The inclu-
sion and/or exclusion of debt service. Debt service, un-
fortunately, seems to have to be carried as a burden by
other divisions in order for the desired financial profita-
bility goals and in some cases, the market place does not
allow this excess burden. Commercial profitability is
measured against sales as a percent and Government profits
is a percent of cost with a not to exceed rate.
18. Do you see a need for prime defense contractors to in-
centivize your firm to make capital investment? (Please
explain your response)
* Yes. Increase production and lower costs.
No. As previously stated the probability of production
follow-on is the best incentive for capital investment.
Yes. Would help us in determining the equipment that
will be most useful in our operation.
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* Yes. In order to allow small business, to expand they
must purchase new equipment and hire and train new people.
No Government contractor or DCAA auditor will allow these
kinds of costs when in some cases they (the costs) do not
apply directly to the contract they are auditing for.
* Yes. It would be helpful, however, the need for capital
investment is generally dictated by actual need and obvious
necessity
.
* Yes. However, the Government is pulling the strings
and the primes can only pass along that latitude in incen-
tives granted them from above.
* Yes. Without question -- With the Government expecting
a low profit margin there remains little incentive for
capital improvement to lower costs in a small company like
ours .
* Yes. Must recognize in profit negotiations and look at
IMIP type contracting.
* Yes. Small business subcontractors must be assisted to
enable them to make the necessary capital investments to
remain viable in the industry. Ordinarily pay-out is too
long for small business to capitalize much equipment. If
it were incentivized per unit prices to the prime and ulti-
mately the Government would drop.
* Yes. In today's market we must see the work prior to
investment to minimize risk of capital funds.
* Yes. To the extent needed to meet the primes objectives.
* Yes. Selfishly, it almost insures a vested interest by
the prime, hence a more long term relationship can be
developed. Future/ongoing business is probably a bottom
line incentive for small business concerns
.
* Yes . The large primes generally have contracts that
allow them to take advantage of capital investment programs
,
however, there is very little pass through to the subcontractors
* Yes. It would reduce cost for certain large or long
term programs (5 years or more) . However, it must be more
specifically defined and make profit incentive relate to the
amount of documented investment.
* Yes. We, like most business firms, will make capital
investments where there are opprotunities to compete for




* Yes. DOD contractors demand higher reliability and
quality hut do not incentlvize capital equipment upgrade
or investment.
Yes. Every effort should be made by the Government
directly or through its. 1
,
primes to provide incentives to
enhance our continued profitability and growth. We must
achieve profit margins which will permit us to continue
our efforts in the Government sector. More often than not,
buyers tend to negotiate the lowest possible profit without
regard to the Governments overall policy of reasonable
profit and return.
* No. We offer competitive bids for most jobs we book.
If we cannot compete then another firm will win. It is
then up to us to make our firm more competitive. It is no
business of either a prime or Government.
* Yes. To the extent that they also share in this same
incentive. Incentives, which in principle sound good, in
practice seem very difficult to implement with today's
multitude of regulations, and in fact, competition.
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FIRM/DIVISION WITH LESS THAN 75% BUT GREATER THAN 10% OF TOTAL
BUSINESS WITH DOD
8. Is your company aware of the DOD Profit Policy and
specifically the capital investment incentivization portion
of the policy? (.If yes, what has been the impact on your
firm?)
Little. Substantial investment in machinery and test
equipment, which is not required, would be needed to make
any significant impact in profit policy.
* No impact at present time, however, we are currently
evaluating our present position to determine advantages
and/or disadvantages
.
* Our Government (Navy) product line is given favorable
consideration respecting capital investment.
* Very little. As with all profit policies to date
"bottom line" price becomes the driver.
* Impacts us only indirectly in that it provides for im-
proved profits and profit is the source of capital
investments
.
11. What methods do prime contractors use to incentivize
your firm to make these productivity enhancing capital
investments?
* Competitive nature of business and desire to maintain
position on major programs generally require a high level
of production efficiency. Often we must commit to production
prices which can only be achieved through capital invest-
ments to reduce labor intensity in order to assure our
competitive position on such programs.
* Potential of greater numbers to be built. This is
based on number of vessels, number of units required.
* Share of savings
* Via IMIP - Such a plan was under consideration in
connection with an F-16 competition. We were unsuccessful
and the prime dropped us from consideration. This was a
one time occurence
.
12. In your opinion, is there any interest on the prime
contractors' part concerning your continued viability as a
defense subcontractor? (Please explain your response)
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* In recent years the mood of primes is to try and create
a feeling of partnership and closer relations to assure
dependable long term commitment.
Primarily to provide multiple potential procurement
sources
.
* Prime interest seems to be price.
* We provide a product and service which is available
only from a very limited number of firms throughout the
world. Our viability is therefore vital with the defense
contracting market.
* Any concerns which exist at the prime level seems to be
related to their ability to remain a viable defense con-
tractor, and they are interested in us only as we affect
their performance.
* In general our prime contractors are satisfied with our
equipment and desire to continue using us as a source for
future defense business
.
* The prime has his own problems, he has no time or
inclination to be concerned with the productivity of some
small subcontractor. The only time he becomes interested
in such things is when the subcontractor is an important
single source.
* They survey our capacity and capabilities in some cases
prior to award of contracts. Also assist in tech and
engineering as required.
* We are one of five primary producers in our field of
technology and provide some unique capabilities for some
products
.
* In most cases, due to a very small number of companies
performing the type of work we do, the loss of one competi-
tor could place the prime in a situation of sole source
procurement on a critical component.
* Because they only look at prices they pay for parts
.
* Only if you can meet all his requirements at a price he
can negotiate downward. Not always in the best interest
of the company.
* Generally they recognize the advantage of having a
healthy subcontractor base.
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* They need competition when they are bidding prime
contracts.. In addition, the prime depends on his sub-
contractors for quality and "on-time" performance so his
schedules and costs are controlled.
* To the extent competition is needed to make the prime
competitive
.
* Many shipbuilding programs would result in substantial
costs to the shipyard (prime) if they had to change vendors
halfway through a program.
* We are the requisite technology on at least one program.
* Business transactions are based on each party's indivi-
dual interests and the best deal for each procurement action.
14. Is your firm familiar with the concept and implementation
of productivity enhancement capital investment programs such
as IMIP, MANTECH, or TECHMOD programs? (If yes, in what
manner has one or more of these programs affected your firm?)
* Currently in discussion state
* Not enough, people to implement
* We are currently studying possible areas for utiliza-
tion of an IMIP agreement with NAVAIR.
* Not conclusive, since we have had an aggressive capital
program for several years to build a new plant. MANTECH
or IMIP may accelerate modernization of the older plant.
* Opportunities to participate in these programs have
only recently been afforded to us.
* We made a proposal to participate in TECHMOD. Prime
did not choose to proceed with us, since we were not awarded
a contract in a competitive procurement action.
17. If the answer to question was negative please explain.
(16. Does Government defense business provide the same
profitability, using your measure of profitability, as
does your commercial business?)
* On occasion less profitable because of stringent
standards. Otherwise, profitability is about on par with
commercial products of the same type.
* Profit is limited
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* Audits b.y Government doesn't recognize the cost of
money; usually knocks, down burden rates; usually knocks
down profit allowance.
With the dominant factor being price, and the increased
involvement of additional agencies (DCAS, DCAA, etc.) it is
impossible in our view to compare profits in defense
business with normal commercial activity.
* Government profit policies limit the maximum profit
regardless of contractors' risk. Some of our commercial
customers require short lead times which require our
maintaining large inventories of complete end component
parts. For this service, they are willing to pay higher
profits
.
* It costs considerably more moeny to do business with
the Government or Government primes. They impose more
requirements, i.e., source inspections, DD 250s, audits,
countless regulations, etc. Also profit (as a percentage
of total cost) is restricted.
* The structure and requirements on Government contracts
provide less flexibility in program implementation. An
example is : commercial contracts can take advantage of the
latest technological developments, Government contracts
often require additional testing and justification.
* Prices to the Government are depressed below commercial
prices, due to bids on large quantities on annual basis.
Statutory limits are placed on profit in Government
business
.
The only prime contract ever issued by Washington re-
quired full disclosure of all financial aspects of project,
thus profit was set as a percentage of sales price by
Government regulation.
* Margins on commercial products are higher. Products
are developed privately and priced based upon market
conditions
.
* Lower percent profit on sales but generally higher on
return on investment.
Government defense business usually has hidden amounts
of administrative costs which are not reflected in the
pricing, therefore less profit on defense business.
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* Companies must have state-of-the-art equipment to do
Government work and low paid labor base. Even with the
above conditions it is hard to get Government work.
* Couldn't compete at the same level - Navy or Government
work highly competitive - Pricing is major determining
factor in making a sale — Many jobs taken at cost or even
less -- No profit.
Defense contractors are tightly controlled. Being
"first or best" in a defense market does not necessarily
increase profits
.
* Frequently it does not when you factor in the G&A the
Government does not accept (interest, Government salespeople,
etc...) otherwise it's about the same.
* Limitation on profit also unallowable overhead expense.
The Government's profit policies do not adequately
reqard innovation since price is a function of cost.
18. Do you see a need for prime defense contractors to
incentivize your firm to make capital investment? (Please
explain your response)
* No. Competition is sufficient
* Yes. Small aerospace job shops are vital to the national
defense of our country.
Yes. Should yield growth opportunities and financial
aid in achieving that growth
.
* Yes. Geneally speaking, production costs often remain
high due to "short term" motivation to maximize return on
assets and net profitability at the expense of updating
plant facility and equipment.
No. Prime contractors are in no way of the problems
or future needs of a small company such as ours .
* Yes. I guess it depends on the incentive. It must go
beyond the concept of capital cost of money which is given
to us on one hand and taken back with the other
.
* No. Don't see how it would work at this point. We've
bought new equipment on our own, as we've seen the need.
What kind of incentives could they provide?
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* Yes. If a defens.e contractor is incentivi.zed in their
prime contract they should also flowdown the provision in
their subcontracts..
No. The existing facilities can and do accomodate
volumes of product many times the volume required by defense
contractors
.
* Yes. If the contracts can justify the capital
investment
.
Yes. If programs were flexible, since technologies,
program requirements and companies create widely varying
needs
.
* Yes. The dichotomy is simply if we invest in capital
improvements will we be in a better position to capture
the competitive procurement for the next fiscal year or will
we obligate ourselves and due to a declining commercial
market, find our competition dropping the price to un-
acceptably low level to capture the business. Multi-year
procurements seem to be an easy and workable solution to
provide stability.
* Yes. Only where the program is large enough to offer
significant inducements for such investment.
* Yes. It might reduce the cost of purchasing from us.
* No. I would rather see the Government look for more in
a company than price along, e.g., quality control, standard,
on time delivery, etc.... Let the manager of the company
make capital investment decisions as business increases
.
* Yes. Only if they could guarantee orders if we indeed
made a capital investment.
* No. Unless some very specialized investments are re-
quired for a particular product or contract.
* Yes. In certain instances with adequate advanced study
and inputs from the subcontractor. However, blanket im-
position of incentive programs could tend to increase sub-
contractor burden.
* No. The decision to make capital investments is based
on many variables . Prime contractors cannot effectively
direct the capital investment needs of a supplier. The
procurement practices of the Government tend to discourage
investment because of short term (yearly) procurement
cycles that Government contracts follow. In order to justi-
fy major capital investments-, long term commitments are
needed to provide an opportunity for a return on the investment
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FIRMS/DIVISIONS WITH. LESS THAN 10% TOTAL DOD BUSINESS
12. In your opinion, is. there any interest on the prime
contractors' part concerning your continued viability as
a defense subcontractor?
* As much as I like to get defense contracts I find it
very difficult to cut through the red tape.
* Limited number of potential suppliers.
Generally no. However, in specific instances the prime
or Navy is interested in our special capabilities. Our
facilities at present have no equal in the U.S.
17. If the answer to question 16 was negative please explain
(16. Does Government defense business provide the same
profitability, using your measure of profitability, as does
your commercial business?)
* The competitive nature of the subcontract letting pro-
cedure keep this from happening. We (subcontractors) are
all bidding against ourselves
.
* Usually labor (engineering) intensive. Quantities
small. Combination leads to poor dollar return based on
effort required.
* Defense business and particularly Navy business has at
best been marginally profitable. We are generally involved
as a subcontractor at the first or second tier level and
work on a FFP basis where the customer may in fact be work-
ing with a CPFF or similiar contract. If our estimates
are wrong or problems develop increasing our internal costs,
we are pretty much stuck without any way to recover the
costs. We are a firm that does a relatively small amount
of Government work and do not maintain staff dedicated to
administering such contracts.
18. Do you see a need for prime defense contractors to
incentivize your firm to make capital investments?
* We need the positive pressure they can exert - It's a
forcing function which would be beneficial to all parties.
We seldom take the time or have the necessary human re-









FIRM SIZE IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
A. 1 - 100
B. 101 - 1 ,000
C. 1,001 - 5,000
D. 5,001 - 10,000










TOTAL 67 100 .00'




























TOTAL 67 100 .00%
3.
THE
PERCENT OF GOVERNMENT BUSINESS IN






















4 . ANNUAL DOLLAR SAVES VOLUME AS A
GOVERNMENT SUBCONTRACTOR
A. less than $100,000
B. $100,000 - $500,000
C. $500,000 - $2,000,000
D. $2,000,000 - $5,000,000









5. THE BASIC MANUFACTURING PROCESS OF YOUR FIRM
CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS:
A. CAPITAL INTENSIVE 14 20.90%
B. LABOR INTENSIVE 22 32.84%
C. BALANCE BETWEEN CAPITAL 31 46.27%
AND LABOR
TOTAL 67 100.00%
8. IS YOUR COMPANY AWARE OF THE DOD PROFIT POLICY
AND SPECIFICALLY THE CAPITAL INVESTMENT PORTION?
A. YES 23 34.33%
B. NO 44 65.67%
TOTAL 67 100.00%
9. IS THERE ANY EFFORT ON THE PRIMES' PART TO
INCENTIVIZE YOU TO INVEST IN PRODUCTIVITY
ENHANCING CAPITAL EQUIPMENT?
A. YES 16 23.88%
B. NO 51 76.12%
TOTAL 67 100.00%
10. IF THE QUESTION 9 WAS POSITIVE HOW EFFECTIVE
ARE THE PRIMES' EFFORTS?
A. NOT EFFECTIVE .00%
B. SOMEWHAT EFFECTIVE 11 68.75%
C. GENERALLY EFFECTIVE 4 2 5.00%
D. VERY EFFECTIVE 1 6.25%
TOTAL 16 100.00%
12. IN YOUR OPINION IS THERE ANY INTEREST ON THE PRIMES
PART CONCERNING YOUR CONTINUED VIABILITY AS A DEFENSE
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. YES 43 64.18%
B. NO 24 35.82%
TOTAL 67 100.00%
13. ON WHAT BASIS DO YOU MAKE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 4 7 50.54%
B. RETURN ON EQUITY 3 3.23%
C. PAYBACK 4 4.30%
D. OTHER 39 41.94%
TOTAL 93 100.00%
*ADDS TO MORE THAN 6 5 DUE TO MORE THAN ONE RESPONSE
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14. IS YOUR FIRM FAMILIAR WITH THE CONCEPT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCING CAPITAL
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS SUCH AS IMIP, MANTECH OR TECHMOD?
A. YES 19. 28.36
B. NO 48 71.64'
TOTAL 67 100 .00%
15 ON WHAT BASIS DOES YOUR FIRM MEASURE PROFITABILITY?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT
B. RETURN ON ASSETS
C. PERCENT OF SALES






















16. DOES GOVERNMENT BUSINESS PROVIDE THE SAME PROFITABILITY,
USING YOUR DEFINITION OF PROFITABILITY, AS YOUR COMMERCIAL
BUSINESS?
A. YES 31 4 6.27%
B. NO 36 53.73%
TOTAL 67 100 .00%
18. DO YOU SEE A NEED FOR PRIME CONTRACTORS


















1. FIRM SIZE IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
A. 1 - 100 8 30 .77% (8 .04%)
B. 101 - 1,000 14 53 .85% 13 .55%
C. 1,001 - 5,000 4 15 .38% (2 .53%)
D. 5,001 - 10,000 .00% (2 .99%)
E. greater than 10,000 .00% .00%
TOTAL 26 100 .00%
2. PERCENT OF TOTAL BUSINESS (SALES)
WITH GOVERNMENT
A. less than 10% 1 3 .85% (8 .09%)
B. 10 - 24% 4 15 .38% 4 .94%
C. 25 - 49% 7 26 .92% 9 .01%
D. 50 - 74% .00% (14 .93%)
E. greater than 75% 14 53 .85% 9 .07%
TOTAL 26 100 .00%
3 . PERCENT OF GOVERNMENT BUSINESS IN THE ROLE
OF A SUBCONTRACTOR
A. less than 10% .00% (13 .43%)
B. 10 - 24% .00% (11 .94%)
C. 25 - 49% .00% (17 .91%)
D. 50 - 74% .00% (17 .91%)
E. greater than 75% 26 100 .00% 61 .19%
TOTAL 26 100.00
4 . ANNUAL DOLLAR SAVES VOLUME AS A GOVERNMENT
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. less than $100,000
B. $100,000 - $500,000
C. $500,000 - $2,000,000
D. $2,000,000 - $5,000,000

















5. THE BASIC MANUFACTURING PROCESS OF YOUR FIRM
CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS:
A. CAPITAL INTENSIVE 6 23.0.8%
B. LABOR INTENSIVE 7 26.92%





TOTAL 26 100 .00%
8. IS YOUR COMPANY AWARE OF THE DOD PROFIT POLICY
AND SPECIFICALLY THE • CAPITAL INVESTMENT PORTION?
A. YES 10 38.46%






9. IS THERE ANY EFFORT ON THE PRIMES' PART TO
INCENTIVIZE YOU TO INVEST IN PRODUCTIVITY
ENHANCING CAPITAL EQUIPMENT?
A. YES 11 42.31%




10 IF THE QUESTION 9 WAS POSITIVE HOW EFFECTIVE


















TOTAL 11 100 .00%
12. IN YOUR OPINION IS THERE ANY INTEREST ON THE PRIMES'
PART CONCERNING YOUR CONTINUED VIABILITY AS A DEFENSE
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. YES 20 76.92% 12.74%
B. NO 6 23.08% (12.74%)
TOTAL 26 100 .00%
13 ON WHAT BASIS DO YOU MAKE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT




















*ADDS TO MORE THAN 6 5 DUE TO MORE THAN ONE RESPONSE
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14. IS YOUR FIRM FAMILIAR WITH THE CONCEPT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCING CAPITAL
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS SUCH AS IMIP, MANTECH OR TECHMOD?
A. YES 10 38.46% 10.10%
B. NO 16 61.54% (10.10%
TOTAL 26 100.00%
15. ON WHAT BASIS DOES YOUR FIRM MEASURE PROFITABILITY?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT
B. RETURN ON ASSETS
C. PERCENT OF SALES



























TO MORE THAN 6 5 DUE TO MORE
36 100.00%
THAN ONE RESPONSE
16 DOES GOVERNMENT BUSINESS PROVIDE THE SAME PROFITABILITY




A. YES 13 50





TOTAL 26 100 .00%
18 . DO YOU SEE A NEED FOR PRIME CONTRACTORS TO PROVIDE
CAPITAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES TO YOUR FIRM?
A. YES 13 50.00% (5









































































10 31.25% 16 .32%
16 50.00% 5.22%
32 100.00TOTAL































4 . ANNUAL DOLLAR SAVES VOLUME AS A GOVERNMENT
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. less than $100,000 2
B. $100,000 - $500,000 3
C. $500,000 - $2,000,000 6
D. $2,000,000 - $5,000,000 4


















5. THE BASIC MANUFACTURING PROCESS OF YOUR FIRM




C. BALANCE BETWEEN CAPITAL
AND LABOR
5 15 .63% (5.27%)
5 46.88% 14 .04%
2 3 7.50.% (8.77%).
TOTAL 32 100. .00
8 . IS YOUR COMPANY AWARE OF THE DOD PROFIT POLICY
AND SPECIFICALLY THE CAPITAL INVESTMENT PORTION?
A. YES 12 37.50%




9 . IS THERE ANY EFFORT ON THE PRIMES ' PART TO
INCENTIVIZE YOU TO INVEST IN PRODUCTIVITY
ENHANCING CAPITAL EQUIPMENT?
A. YES 5 15.15%
B. NO 28 84.85%
(8.73%)
8.73%
TOTAL 33 10 0.00%
10 IF THE QUESTION 9 WAS POSITIVE HOW EFFECTIVE
















12. IN YOUR OPINION IS THERE ANY INTEREST ON THE PRIMES'
PART CONCERNING YOUR CONTINUED VIABILITY AS A DEFENSE
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. YES 22 68.75% 4.57%
B. NO 10 31.25% (4.57%)
TOTAL 32 100.00%
13. ON WHAT BASIS DO YOU MAKE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT







TO MORE THAN 6 5 DUE TO MORE
23 52.27% 1.74%






14. IS YOUR FIRM FAMILIAR WITH THE CONCEPT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCING CAPITAL
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS SUCH AS IMIP, MANTECH OR TECHMOD?
A. YES 9 28.13% (
B. NO 23 71.88%
23%)
23%
TOTAL 32 100 .00%
5. ON WHAT BASIS DOES YOUR FIRM MEASURE PROFITABILITY?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 2 4.35% .05%
B. RETURN ON ASSETS 10 21.74% (1 .92%)
C. PERCENT OF SALES 24 52.17% (3 .74%)
D. RETURN ON EQUITY 8 17.39% 5 .56%
E. OTHER 2 4.35% .05%
:ADDS
TOTAL
TO MORE THAN 6 5 DUE TO MORE
46 100.00%
THAN ONE RESPONSE
16. DOES GOVERNMENT BUSINESS PROVIDE THE SAME PROFITABILITY,
USING YOUR DEFINITION OF PROFITABILITY, AS YOUR COMMERCIAL
BUSINESS?
A. YES 14 43.75% (2.52%)
B. NO 18 56.25% 2.52%
TOTAL 32 100.00%
18. DO YOU SEE A NEED FOR PRIME CONTRACTORS TO PROVIDE
CAPITAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES TO YOUR FIRM?
A. YES 22 68.75% 13.53%
B. NO 10 31.25% (13.53%)
TOTAL 32 100.00%
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FIRMS WITH LESS THAN 10 PERCENT DOD SUBCONTRACTS
COMPARED
ABSOLUTE RELATIVE TO TOTAL
QUESTION FREQUENCY FREQUENCY POPULATION
1. FIRM SIZE IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
A. 1 - 100 7 77.78% 38 .97%
B. 101 - 1,000 2 22.22% (18 .08%)
C. 1,001 - 5,000 .00% (17.91%)
D. 5,001 - 10,000 .00% (2.99%)
E. greater than 10,000 .00% .00%
TOTAL 9 100 .00%






B. 10 - 24%
C. 25 - 49%












































4 . ANNUAL DOLLAR SAVES VOLUME AS A GOVERNMENT
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. less than $100,000 6
B. $100,000 - $500,000 1
C. $500,000 - $2,000,000 1
D. $2,000,000 - $5,000,000 1









5. THE BASIC MANUFACTURING PROCESS OF YOUR FIRM
CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS:
A. CAPITAL INTENSIVE
B. ' LABOR INTENSIVE












8. IS YOUR COMPANY AWARE OF THE DOD PROFIT POLICY
AND SPECIFICALLY THE CAPITAL INVESTMENT PORTION?
A. YES 1 11.11%






9 . IS THERE ANY EFFORT ON THE PRIMES ' PART TO
INCENTIVIZE YOU TO INVEST IN PRODUCTIVITY
ENHANCING CAPITAL EQUIPMENT?
A. YES .00%






10. IF THE QUESTION 9 WAS POSITIVE HOW EFFECTIVE






12. IN YOUR OPINION IS THERE ANY INTEREST ON THE PRIMES'
PART CONCERNING YOUR CONTINUED VIABILITY AS A DEFENSE
SUBCONTRACTOR?
A. YES 1 11.11% (53.07%)
B. NO 8 88.89% 53.07%
TOTAL 100.00%
13 ON WHAT BASIS DO YOU MAKE CAPITAL INVESTMENTS?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT
























14. IS YOUR FIRM FAMILIAR WITH THE CONCEPT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCING CAPITAL
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS SUCH AS IMIP, MANTECH OR TECHMOD?
A. YES .00% (28 .36%)
B. NO 9 100 .00% 28 .36%
TOTAL 9 100.00%
5. ON WHAT BASIS DOES YOUR ]?IRM MEASURE PROFITABILITY?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT .00% (4 .30%)
B. RETURN ON ASSETS 1 9.09% (14 .57%)
C. PERCENT OF SALES 9 81.82% 25 .90%
D. RETURN ON EQUITY 1 9 .09% (2 .74%
E. OTHER .00% (4 .30%
TOTAL 11 100 .00%
*ADDS 'ro MORE THAN 6 5 DUE TO MORE : THAN ONE RESPONSE
16. DOES GOVERNMENT BUSINESS PROVIDE THE SAME PROFITABILITY,
USING YOUR DEFINITION OF PROFITABILITY, AS YOUR COMMERCIAL
BUSINESS?
A. YES 4 44.44% (1.82%)
B. NO 5 55.56% 1.82%
TOTAL 100.00%
18. DO YOU SEE A NEED FOR PRIME CONTRACTORS TO PROVIDE
CAPITAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES TO YOUR FIRM?
A. YES 2 22.22% (33






FIRMS WITH GREATER THAN 75 PERCENT DOD BUSINESS
DIFFERENCE
* COMPARED
ABSOLUTE RELATIVE TO TOTAL
QUESTION FREQUENCY FREQUENCY POPULATION
1. FIRM SIZE IN TERMS ON NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
A. 1-100 9 30.00% (8.81%)
B. 101 - 1,000 14 46.67% 6.37%
C. 1,001 - 5,000 6 20.00% 2.09%
D. 5,001 - 10,000 1 3.33% .35%
E. greater than 10,000 .00% .00%
TOTAL 30 100.00%



























































TOTAL 30 100 .00
4 . ANNUAL DOLLAR SAVES VOLUME AS A GOVERNMENT
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. less than $100,000
B. $100,000 - $500,000
C. $500,000 - $2,000,000
D. $2,000,000 - $5,000,000


















5. THE BASIC MANUFACTURING PROCESS OF YOUR FIRM
CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS:
A. CAPITAL INTENSIVE
B. LABOR INTENSIVE












30 10 0.0 0-%
8. IS YOUR COMPANY AWARE OF THE DOD PROFIT POLICY
AND SPECIFICALLY THE CAPITAL INVESTMENT PORTION?
A. YES 14 46.67% 12




9. IS THERE ANY EFFORT ON THE PRIMES' PART TO
INCENTIVIZE YOU TO INVEST IN PRODUCTIVITY
ENHANCING CAPITAL EQUIPMENT?
A. YES 11 36.67'



























12. IN YOUR OPINION IS THERE ANY INTEREST ON THE PRIMES'
PART CONCERNING YOUR CONTINUED VIABILITY AS A DEFENSE
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. YES 22 73.33% 9.15%
B. NO 8 26.67% (9.15%)





































14. IS YOUR FIRM FAMILIAR WITH THE CONCEPT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCING CAPITAL













TOTAL 30 100 .00%
15. ON WHAT BASIS DOES YOUR FIRM MEASURE PROFITABILITY?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT
B. RETURN ON ASSETS
C. PERCENT OF SALES
























16. DOES GOVERNMENT BUSINESS PROVIDE THE SAME PROFITABILITY,
USING YOUR DEFINITION OF PROFITABILITY, AS YOUR COMMERCIAL
BUSINESS?
A. YES 16 53.33% 7.06%
B. NO 14 46.67% (7.06%)
TOTAL 30 100 .00%
18. DO YOU SEE A NEED FOR PRIME CONTRACTORS TO PROVIDE
CAPITAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES TO YOUR FIRM?
A. YES 21 70.00% 14.78%
B. NO 9 30.00% (14.78%)
TOTAL 30 100.00'
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ABSOLUTE RELATIVE TO TOTAL
QUESTION FREQUENCY FREQUENCY POPULATION
1. FIRM SIZE IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
A. 1 - 100 12 41.38% 2 .57%
B. 101 - 1,000 11 37.93% (2 .37%)
C. 1,001 - 5,000 6 20.69% 2 .78%
D. 5,001 - 10,000 .00% (2 .99%)
E. greater than 10,000 .00% .00%
TOTAL 29 100.00%
2. PERCENT OF TOTAL BUSINESS (SALES)
WITH GOVERNMENT
A. less than 10% .00% (11 .94%)
B. 10 - 24% 7 24.14% 13 .69%
C. 25 - 49% 12 41.38% 23 .47%
D. 50 - 74% 10 34.48% 19 .56%
D. greater than 75% .00% (44 .78%)
TOTAL 29 10 0.0.0%

































4 . ANNUAL DOLLAR SAVES VOLUME AS A GOVERNMENT
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. less than $100,000
B. $100,000 - $500,000
C. $500,000 - $2,000,000
D. $2,000,000 - $5,000,000











2 » -J <6 "6
(11 .79%)
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5. THE BASIC MANUFACTURING PROCESS OF YOUR FIRM
CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS:
A. CAPITAL INTENSIVE 8
B. LABOR INTENSIVE 9








TOTAL 29 100 .00
8 . IS YOUR COMPANY AWARE OF THE DOD PROFIT POLICY








9. IS THERE ANY EFFORT ON THE PRIMES' PART TO
INCENTIVIZE YOU TO INVEST IN PRODUCTIVITY
ENHANCING CAPITAL INVESTMENT?
A. YES 5 17.24%




10 IF THE QUESTION 9 WAS POSITIVE HOW EFFECTIVE
















12. IN YOUR OPINION IS THERE ANY INTEREST ON THE PRIMES'
PART CONCERNING YOUR CONTINUED VIABILITY AS A DEFENSE
SUBCONTRACTOR?
A. YES 18 62.07% (2.11%)





































14. IS YOUR FIRM FAMILIAR WITH THE CONCEPT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PRODUCTIVITY ENAHNCING CAPITAL
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS SUCH AS IMIP, MANTECE OR TECHMOD?
A. YES 7 24 .14% (4 .22%)
B. NO 22 75.86% 4 « Z <-
TOTAL 29 100 .00%
5. ON WHAT BASIS DOES YOUR ]FIRM MEASURE PROFITABILITY?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 2 5.00% .70%
B. RETURN ON ASSETS 10 25.00% 1 .34%
C. PERCENT OF SALES 21 52.50% (3 .41%)
D. RETURN ON EQUITY 5 12.50% .67%
E. OTHER 2 5.00% .70%
TOTAL 40 100 .00%
*ADDS 'I?0 MORE THAN 6 5 DUE TO MORE THAN ONE RESPONSE
16. DOES GOVERNMENT BUSINESS PROVIDE THE SAME PROFITABILITY,
USING YOUR DEFINITION OF PROFITABILITY, AS YOUR COMMERCIAL
BUSINESS?
A. YES 10 34.48% (11.79%)
B. NO 19 65.52% 11.79%
TOTAL 29 100 .00%
18. DO YOU SEE A NEED FOR PRIME CONTRACTORS TO PROVIDE
CAPITAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES TO YOUR FIRM?
A. YES 13 44.83% (10
B. NO 16 55.17% 10
40%)
40%
TOTAL 29 100 .00%
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1. FIRM SIZE IN TERMS OF NUMBER OF EMPLOYEES
A. 1 - 100
B. 101 - 1,000
C. 1,000 - 5,000
D. 5,001 - 10,000


















TOTAL 8 100 .00%


























































4. ANNUAL DOLLAR SAVES VOLUME AS A GOVERNMENT
SUBCONTRACTOR
A. less than $100,000
B. $100,000 - $500,000
C. $500,000 - $2,000,000
D. $2,000,000 - $5,000,000






















5. THE BASIC MANUFACTURING PROCESS OF YOUR FIRM
CAN BEST BE DESCRIBED AS:
A. CAPITAL INTENSIVE
B. LABOR INTENSIVE
C. BALANCE BETWEEN CAPITAL
AND LABOR
TOTAL
8. IS YOUR COMPANY AWARE OF THE DOD PROFIT POLICY
AND SPECIFICALLY THE CAPITAL INVESTMENT PORTION?
A. YES - 1 .12.50% (21.83%)
B. NO 7 87.50% 21.83%
TOTAL 8 100.00%
9. IS THERE ANY EFFORT ON THE PRIMES' PART TO





10. IF THE QUESTION 9 WAS






12. IN YOUR OPINION IS THERE ANY INTEREST ON THE PRIMES'
PART CONCERNING YOUR CONTINUED VIABILITY AS A DEFENSE
SUBCONTRACTOR?
A. YES 3 37.50% (26.68%)
B. NO 5 62.50% 26.68%
TOTAL
.00% (23 .88%)







A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT






















14. IS YOUR FIRM FAMILIAR WITH THE CONCEPT AND
IMPLEMENTATION OF PRODUCTIVITY ENHANCING CAPITAL
INVESTMENT PROGRAMS SUCH AS IMIP, MANTECH OR TECHMOD?
A. YES .00% (28.3 6%)
B. NO 8 100.00% 28.36%
TOTAL 8 100.00%
5. ON WHAT BASIS DOES YOUR FIRM MEASURE PROFITABILITY?
A. RETURN ON INVESTMENT 1 10.00% 5,.70%
B. RETURN ON ASSETS 1 10.00% (13,.66%)
C. PERCENT OF SALES 7 70.00% 14 .09%
D. RETURN ON EQUITY 1 10.00% CI..83%)
E. OTHER .00% (4,.30%)
TOTAL 10 100.00%
*ADDS TO MORE THAN 6 5 DUE TO MORE THAN ONE RESPONSE
6. DOES GOVERNMENT BUSINESS PROVIDE





, AS YOUR COMMERCIAL
62.50% 16.23%
37.50% (16.23%)
TOTAL 8 100 .00%
18. DO YOU SEE A NEED FOR PRIME CONTRACTORS TO PROVIDE
CAPITAL INVESTMENT INCENTIVES TO YOUR FIRM?
A. YES 3 37.50% (17.72%)
B. NO 5 62.50% 17.72%
TOTAL 8 100 .00%
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APPENDIX G
SIC CODES AND DEFINITIONS
SIC CODE # OF FIRMS DEFINITIONS
2891 1 Adhesives and Sealants
289.2 1 Explosives
3452 1 Bolts, Nuts, Screws, Rivets
and Washers
3463 1 Non Ferrous Forgings
3483 1 Ammunition except for Small
Arms
3 561 1 Pump and Pumping Equipment
3564 1 Ball and Roller Bearings
3613 1 Switch Gear and Switchboard
Apparatus
3622 1 Welding A-paratus Electrical
3643 1 Current Carrying Wiring
Devices
3660 1 Communication Equipment
3662 6 Radio and Television Transmit-
ting, Signaling, and Detection
Equipment
3679 4 Electrical Components not
elsewhere classified
3700 1 Transportation Equipment
3721 1 Aircraft




3764 1 Guided Missile and Space
Vehicle Propulsion Units and
Propulsion Unit Parts
3829 1 Measuring and Controlling
Devices not elsewhere
classified




1. Logistics Management Institute, LMI task 76-3, Profit '76,
December 1976
.
2. United States Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition
Circular 76-39, Government Printing Office, Washington
,
DC, 20 October 1982.
3. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject:
Guidance on the Acquisition Improvement Program (AIP) ,
"
8 June 1983.
4. Gansler, J. S., The Defense Industry
,
MIT Press, 1982.
5. Frisch, F. A. P., and Acker, D.D., "Financing Defense
Systems Programs," Concepts
, pp. 7-28, Winter 1980.
6. Anderson, P. A., POD Profit Policy Its Ef fectiveness—
The Contracting Officer's View
,
M.S. Thesis, Naval
Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1980.
7. Air Force Institute of Technology Technical Report 77-5,
Some Implications of Defense Procurement Circular 76-3
on Defense Contractor Profits , by W. C. Letzkus
,
September 1977.
8. McCullough, J. L., Department of Defense Profit Policy:
A Test of the New Approach
,
Florida Institute of
Technology, Melbourne, June 1977.
9. United States General Accounting Office, Report to
Congress, PSAD 79-38, Recent Changes in the Defense




10. United States Department of Defense, Defense Acquisition
Circular 76-23
,
Government Printing Office, Washington,
DC, 26 February 1980.
11. Simonson, G. R. , "Misconceptions of Profit in Defense
Policy", National Contract Management Jour nal , v. 15,
Summer 1982.
12. Air Force Systems Command, DCS/Contracting and Manufac-
turing, Profit Study '82.
173
13. Perino, G. H. Jr., "What Price Defense? Profit and
Profitability in Defense Industry", Program Manager,
May-June 19 83.
14. Greer, W. R. Jr., and Liao, S. S., "Contractor "Hungri-
ness" and the Relative Profitability of DOD Business",
Proceedings from the 1983 Federal Acquisition Research
Symposium , Williamsburg, Virginia, December 1983.
15. National Defense University Research Project, DOD Profit
Policy and Capital Investment
,
by J. T. Janicke et al,
May 1980.




17. Collins, 0. M., "Impact of Corporate Resource Allocation
Decisions on National Security Objectives: Dissynergism
in Aerospace Industrial Resource Planning," Proceed ings
from the 1983 Federal Acquisition Research Sympos ium
,
Williamsburg, Virginia, December 1983.
18. Air Force Systems Command, "Contracting Methodology,"
CEO Conference , 6 June 1984.
19. United States Army Logistics Center, Army Procurement
Research Office, Requisites for Contractor Productivity
Improvement
,
by W. V. Zabel and M. G. Norton, July 1981.
20. United States Department of Defense, Draft DOD Guide:
Improving Productivity in Defense Contracting
,
Government
Printing Office, Washington, DC, 1982.
21. Mittino, J. A., "Productivity Improvement in the Acquisi-
tion Process," Proceedings from the 19 84 NASA Symposium
on Productivity and Quality , Washington, DC, 1984.
22. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject:




23. Herring, J., and Brandt, L
.
, "Summary and Status of the
DOD Industrial Modernization Incentive Program (IMIP),"
National Defense
, January 1984.
24. Herring, J., and Brandt, L., "The DOD Industrial Modern-
ization Incentives Program (IMIP) and the IMIP Test,"
Naval Material Command Slide Brief, Washington, DC, 1984.
174
25. Deputy Secretary of Defense Memorandum, Subject:
Guidance on the Defense Acquis i tion Imp rovement Program,
June 6, 1984.
26. Rand Corporation Number R-2184/1-AF, Air Force Contract
F49620-77-C-0023, Peacetime Adequacy of the Lower Tiers
of the Defense Industrial Base , by G. G. Baumbusch and
A. J. Harman, November 1977.
27. Air Force Aeronautical Systems Division, Blueprint for
Tomorrow Executive Brochure , Wright Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio, May, 1983.
28. Williams, R. F., "Designing the Equitable Risk Contract,"
Proceedings from the Federal Acquisitio n Re search




1. Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, Virginia 22314
2. Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
3. Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange 1
U. S. Army Logistics Management Center
Fort Lee, Virginia 23801
4. Department Chairman, Code 54Gk 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
5. CDR David Lamm, Code 54Lt 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
6. CDR Dean Guyer, Code 54Gu 1
Department of Administrative Sciences
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, California 93943
7. LT Keith S. Holtsclaw 1
1720 50th Ave. N.W.
Gig Harbor, Washington 98335
8. Navy Office of Acquisition Research 1




Defense Financial and Investment Review
















used by prime contrac-
tors on subcontractors.
Capital investment motivational techniqu
3 2768 002 06950 2
DUDLEY KNOX LIBRARY
